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Our Kardashian Court (and How to Fix It)
Suzanna Sherry*

ABSTRACT: The Supreme Court is broken. After catalogingits dysfunctions,
this Article suggests a contributing cause and proposes a solution. The

contributing cause is that Justices have become celebrities, and, like other
celebrities, play to theirfan base. The solution is to limit their opportunities
to use their official status to do so: Congress should pass a law prohibiting
concurring or dissenting opinions and requiringeach case to be decided by
an unsigned opinion that does not disclose the number ofJustices who join it.
The Article outlines the advantages of such a law and considers possible

objections to it, including both constitutional and nonconstitutional
objections. It ultimately concludes that it would be constitutional and that
although there are significant risks, the probable benefits outweigh the
probable costs. And because it is a statutory solution rather than a
constitutional one, it can be viewed as an experiment that can easily be
terminated if it does not work out. In the current climate, it is a risk worth

taking.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court is broken. Public confidence in the Court has
dropped; both the institution and individual Justices are accused of playing
politics with the Constitution by allowing ideology to trump the rule of law.
Calls for change-everything from term limits to court-packing to
impeachment-are increasing in volume. Some scholars and pundits warn of
a crisis of legitimacy. In this Article, after arguing that most of these critiques
have missed an important contributing cause of the Court's current
dysfunctionality, I propose and defend a novel statutory solution.
The contributing cause is that individualJustices have become celebrities
akin to the Kardashians., Television appearances, books, movies, stump
speeches, and separate opinions aimed at the Justices' polarized fan bases
have created cults of personality around individual Justices. In Part II of this
Article, I catalogue the Court's dysfunctions and the Justices' status as
celebrities, and show how the two are linked. Part III then begins by
explaining why none of the solutions offered by others can solve the Court's
problems. The heart of Part III is a description and defense of my own
solution: Congress should pass a law prohibiting concurring or dissenting
opinions and requiring each case to be decided by an unsigned opinion that
does not disclose the number of Justices who join it. In other words, no
concurrences, no dissents, no attribution, and no vote counts. In Part IV, I

consider, and respond to, possible objections to my proposal: both
constitutional and nonconstitutional. I conclude that my proposed legislation
is constitutionally valid and that its benefits outweigh its potential costs. Part
V offers a brief conclusion.
To be clear: I recognize the risk that my proposal might backfire and
make things worse rather than better. After I lay out the potential advantages
and disadvantages, readers will then have to decide for themselves whether
the Court's current dysfunctions warrant taking that risk.

1. Ironically, Kim Kardashian West is planning to take the California bar exam. See Claudia
Koerner, Kim KardashianWest Is Studying to Take the Bar Exam and Become a Lawyer, BuzzvE ani NEWs
(Apr. so, 2019, 5:57 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/claudiakoerner/kim-kardashianwest-bar-exam-lawyer-alice-johnson [https://pema.cc/S7SP-ZDYY]. At some point in the future,
we may have not only a Kardashian Court, but a Kardashian on the Court.
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WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE SUPREME COURT?

A.

A DYSn UNCTIONA L SUPIEAME COURT

The Supreme Court is dysfunctional in many ways. It is deciding half as
many cases as it did a generation ago, and using twice as many pages to do so. 2
Concurrences and dissents abound, including such absurdities as "Justice
Scalia joins this [unanimous] opinion, except as to footnotes 6 and 7."3 The
number of cases, especially controversial cases, without a majority opinion at
all is increasing.4 The Justices snipe at each other in dueling opinions, often
well beyond the bounds of civility.5 The Court is polarized: "Since 2010,

2.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court and Celebrily Cu(lure, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
299, 301 (2o1 3); Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. Ciii. L. REV. 1455, 1459-60 ('995);
Joshua B. Edelman, One Case, goo Pages 2-5 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(graphically displaying data on number of cases and number of pages and extrapolating both to
the year 2159).
3.
Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 503, 505 n.* (2013); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138
S. Ct. 830, 852 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) ("Justice Thomas, with whom Justice
Gorsuch joins except for footnote 6, concurring in Part I and Parts III-VI and concurring in the
judgment."); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017)
("Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote 3."); Bank of
Am., N.A. v. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. 1995, 1998 n.* (2015) ("Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer, and
Justice Sotomayor join this opinion, except as to the footnote."); Loughrin v. United States, 134
S. Ct. 2384, 2395 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("I join Parts I and II of the Court's
opinion, Part III-A except the last paragraph, and the last footnote in Part III-B. I do not join
the remainder of Part III-B."); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545,
548 n.* (2014) ("Justice Scalia joins this opinion except as to footnotes 1-3."); Sandifer v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 222 n.t (2o14) ("Justice Sotomayor joins this opinion except as
to footnote 7."); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 253 (2010)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("I join the opinion of the Court, except for footnote 3 .");
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 815 (2oo9) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Ijoin Justice Stevens'
dissent except for footnote 5."); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("I therefore join the Court's opinion except as to footnote 1 and
Part II-B, and I join Justice Stevens' opinion in part."); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 55o U.S.
437, 441 (2007) ("Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote
14."). That many of these nitpicky refusals to join colleagues' opinions are in cases that are
neither high profile nor politically salient reinforces the notion that something is very wrong at
1 First Street.
4.
See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, QuestioningMarks: PluralityDecisions and PrecedenhialConstrainl,
69 SIAN. L. Rnv. 795, 799-800 (2017); James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Exp lainng Plurality
Decisions, gg GEO. L.J. 515, 519 (2011); Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance 1unction:
Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 207, 231.

5. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754-57 (2020) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (calling the majority opinion "deceptive," "preposterous," of "breathtaking"
arrogance, and "like a pirate ship"); Gee v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc., 139 S. Ct.
408, 410 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (accusing the majority of
denying certiorari because "respondents ... are named 'Planned Parenthood,"' and stating that
"[s]ome tenuous connection to a politically fraught issue does not justify abdicating our judicial
duty"); Miller v. Parker, 139 S. Ct. 399, 399 (2o18) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (labeling the results of the majority's decision "madness" that "should not continue");
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The majority's
decision is an act of will, not legal judgment."); id. at 263o n.22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If .. .I
ever joined an opinion for the Court that began [as this one does,] I would hide my head in a
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... all of the Supreme Court's Republican-nominated Justices have been to
the right of Democratic-nominated Justices." 6 The public, with a little help
from the media and some academics,7 believes the Court is almost entirely a
political institution, deciding most cases on the basis of ideology with little or
no regard for "law." 8 Unsurprisingly, public confidence in the Supreme Court
has dropped.o The nomination and confirmation process has been described
as "[a]n unhealthy regime of scheming, posturing, and gamesmanship.",

bag."); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 799 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the
majority opinion a "disappearing trail of... legalistic argle-bargle").
6.

NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, TILE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS

see also id. at 157 ("Justices now act more as adherents
to one ideological side, a side increasingly identified in partisan terms, than they did for most of
the Court's history.").
7.
The media are more likely to report on-and label as political rather than legal-cases
CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 4 (2o9);

in which the Court is closely divided. See MICHAEL F. SALAMONE, PERCEPTIONS OF A POLARIZED
COURT: HOW DIVISION AMONG JUSTICES SIiAPES TIIE SUPREME COURT'S PUBLIC IMAGE 66-1 16,

&

148-49 (2018). For the seminal academic work suggesting that Justices vote primarily on the
basis of ideology (as modified by strategic concerns), see generally JEFFREYA. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAEII, TIIE SUPREME COURT AND iIE ATITIUDINAL MODEL (1993); and LLE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGIIT, TILE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). For contrary evidence, see generally Joshua B.
Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme Court, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1671
(2016); Paul H. Edelman, David E. Klein & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Consensus, Disorder, and Ideology
on the Supreme Court, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 129 (201 2); Michael A. Bailey & Forrest
Maltzman, Does Legal DoctrineMatter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court,
102 AM. POI. SCE. REV. 369 (2008); Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duly: Why Does the Supreme
Court Invalidate FederalStatutes?, i o i AM. POL. SCI. REV. 3 21 (2007); and Stefanie A. Lindquist
David E. Klein, The Influence ofJurisprudenlialConsiderationson Supreme CourtDecisionmaking:A Study
of Con/lict Cases; 4o LAW & SOC'YREV. 135 (2006).

&

8.
A survey i5 years ago found that "75% [of Americans] say ajudge's ruling is influenced
by his or her politics to a great or moderate extent." Kathleen HallJamieson & Michael Hennessy,
Public Understandingof and Support for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, goo (2007); see
also Dan M. Kahan, David Hoffman, Danieli Evans, Neal Devins, Eugene Lucci & Katherine
Cheng, "Ideology" or "Situation Sense"? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and
Pro/essionalJudgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 351 (2016) ("[A]bout three-quarters of Americans
believe that judges-U.S. Supreme Court Justices and lower court jurists alike-base their
decisions on their 'personal political views."').
9.
See, eg., RICiiARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN TIlE SUPREME COURT 156-57
(2018); Richard L. Hasen, Celebrity Justice: Supreme Court Edition, I 9 GREEN BAG 2D 157, 170
n.32 (2016). For a connection between media portrayal of the Justices as politically motivated
and a decrease in public confidence in the legitimacy of the Court, see generally Dino
P. Christenson & David M. Glick, Chief Justice Roberts's IHealth Care Decision Disrobed: The
Microfoundations of the Supreme Court's Legitimacy, 59 AM. J. POL. SCE 403 (2015).
10.

FALLON,

supra note 9,

at 165; see also CARL HUISE, CONFIRMATION BIAS: INSIDE

WASHINGTON'S WAR OVER THE SUPREME COURT, FROM SCALIA'S DEATH TO JUSTICE KAVANAUGH 7

-8 (2o19) (discussing the Republican push for appointing conservative judges in 2016); DEVINS
& BAUM, supra note 6, at 109 (discussing the Kavanaugh hearings as typical of the current era);
Jane S. Schacter, Putting the Politics of 'Judicial Activism" in HlistoricalPerspective, 2017 SUP. CT. Ruv.
209, 252-54; Michael Scherer & Robert Costa, 'Rock Botlom': Supreme Court Jighl Reveals Country
on the Brink, WASI. POST (Oct. 6, 2018, 6:o1 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
rock-bottom-supreme-court-fight-reveals-a-country-on-the-brink/2o 1 8/ I o/o6/426886e2-cg6f11e8-bled-1d2d6 5 b86doc-story.html [https://perma.cc/CQH-TPAJ].
See also generally
STEPIIEN L. CARTFR, TIlE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP TIlE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS (1994) (describing "what is wrong with our confirmation process, how it got this way,
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Chief Justice Roberts has opined that neither Justice Ginsburg nor Justice
Scalia would be confirmed today." All of this has led to what some are calling
a crisis of legitimacy.12 Even if things are not quite as dire as a crisis of
legitimacy, the Court and the rule of law certainly seem to be in trouble.
B.

JUSTICES AS CELEBRITIES

Despite these well-rehearsed criticisms of the Court, most scholars have
overlooked one further problem, which exacerbates the others and
contributes to the Court's dysfunctionality: Justices have become celebrities
who bask in their fame and market their brands. As Richard Hasen put it in a
blog post, some Justices have become "rock star Justices, drawing adoring
crowds who celebrate [them] as though they were teenagers meeting
Beyonc6."r' There are not one but two movies centered on Justice Ginsburg;
one of them was written by her nephew with her consultationl4 and the other
included an appearance by the Justice herself.15 Journalist Nina Totenberg's
live interview ofJustice Ginsburg sold out a 15,5oo-seat stadium in Little Rock,
with an additional 16,ooo people on a waiting list.' 6 Justice Ginsburg was even
the theme subject of a daily New York Times crossword puzzle, with answers
including not only her name but also "the notorious RBG," "Columbia"
and what we can do to fix it"). Bul

c

MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF

SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (2004) (concluding in 2004 that the process was working well).

Be Confined Today (Audio),
[https://perma.cc/RQ6Z-MRT 4 ]; see also DEVINS

Brent Martin, Chief justice Roberts: Scalia, Ginsbwg Wouldn't
2014),

&

it.

NEB. RADIO NETWORK (Sept. 19,

BAUM, supra note 6, at x ("[T]he days of lopsided bipartisan [confirmation] votes are behind
us."); Joan Biskupic, justice GinsburgReflec/s on Term, Leadership Role, USA TODAY (June 3o, 201 1,
10:48 PM), http://usatoday3o.usatoday.con/news/washington/judicial/2011-o7-) -supremecourt-ginsburgn.htm [https://perma.cc/VBJ-MCF9] (interviewing Justice Ginsburg, who
suggested the bipartisan vote on her nomination would not occur today).
12.
See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman & Daniel Epps, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J.
148, 148 (2o 19) (describingJustices' tendency "to vote along party lines more consistently than
ever before in American history" as a "development [that] gravely threatens the Court's
legitimacy"); Zack Beauchamp, The Supreme Court's Legitimacy Crisis Is Here, VOX (Oct. 6, 2018,
4:02 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/ 2018/ I o/6/ I 79 1 5854/brett-kavanaughsenate-confirmed-supreme-court-legitimacy. "Legitmacy" may mean either what Fallon labels
"sociological legitimacy" or legitimacy in the eyes of the public. See FALLON, supranote 9, at 156
-57. Whether or not there is such a crisis, claiming a legitimacy crisis is a good way to generate
what two scholars have called "existential politics," a willingness to flout constitutional or political
norms. Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric ConstitutionalHardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
915, 974-76 (2018).
13. Richard L. Hasen, Siloed Justices and the Law/Politics Divide, BAIKINIZATION (Apr. 2,
2019), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2oi9/o 4 /siloed-justices-and-lawpoliftcs-divide.html [https://
perma.cc/8TMM-ZERA]. Hasen has documented an eight-fold increase in public appearances
by the Justices over the past decade or so. See Hasen, supra note 9, at 158.
14.
See Anne Thompson, Ru/h Bader Ginsburg Guided 'On the Basis of Sex,' Say Armie Hammer
and Felicity Jones, INDIEWIRL (Dec. 26, 2o18, i2:00 PM), https://www.indiewire.com/2018/12/
on-the-basis-of-sex-ruth-bader-ginsburg-armie-hammer-felicity-jones-1 202030 1 47.
15.
See Kate Harloe, How Two 'i/nmakers Convinced RBG to Lel Them 1'dlm Her Workoul,
MiTIIER JONES (May 4, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/o 5 /how-twofilmmakers-convinced-rbg-to-let-them-film-her-workout [https://perma.cc/J4Q 5 -GPTD].
16. Nina Totenberg (@NinaTotenberg), TWITTER (Sept. 4, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://
twitter.com/NinaTotenberg/status/ 1 1693308704587571 25.
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(clued as where she finished law school), Flatbush (clued as where she grew
up), and her movie "On the Basis of Sex." 7 Justice Scalia gave so many public
speeches-most in non-legal forums-that a former clerk and the Justice's
son collected, edited, and published the "best" ones in a 4oo-page book after
the Justice's death., As if the movies and carefully curated collection of
speeches weren't enough to ensure their continuing legacies, there is also an
opera about Justices Ginsburg and Scalia.'9 A recent New York Times article
speculated that Justice Thomas might soon become "the kind of pop-culture
icon to his followers that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has become to hers."20
Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor have all appeared on mainstream
television, just as Justice Scalia did.21 During the past five years, Justice
Sotomayor has made almost 200 public appearances.22 Justices Sotomayor
and Thomas have both written politically tinged autobiographies and gone
on promotional book tours.,. Justice Gorsuch has written a book that includes
a discussion of his controversial confirmation battle.24 Justice Thomas' wife
published a magazine article defending him after his contentious

17.
See 0630-20 NY Times Crossword, NYX CROSSWORD (June 30, 2020), https://
nyxcrossword.com/2o2o/o6/o630-20-ny-times-crossword-3o-jun-2o-tuesday.html
[https://
perma.cc/ 7 XTN-UL2G].
18.
ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH, AND LIFE WELL LIVFD
(ChristopherJ. Scalia & Edward Whelan eds., 2017).
1g.
See Derrick Wang, Scalia/Ginsburg, DERRICK WANG, http://www.derrickwang.com/
scalia-ginsburg [https://perma.cc/V 7J 9 -JYHC].
20. Nicholas Casey, Passed by for Decades, Clarence Thomas Is a New Symbol of the Trump Era, N.Y.
TIMES (July 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2o2o/05/18/us/politics/clarence-thomassuprene-court.htnl [https://perna.cc/4JDD-P 7 A 7 ].
21.
See Hasen, supra note 9, at 16o-61 (noting that Scalia, Thomas, and Sotomayor have all
appeared on 6o Minutes); Ariane de Vogue, In Rare Interview, Clarence Thomas Calls Gorsuch
'Outstanding,' CNN (Nov. 2, 2017, 9:16 AM), https://www.cnn.con/2017/I 1/02/
politics/clarence-thomas-neil-gorsuch/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 7 TSC-TZ 4 7 ] (describing
an interview on Fox News); Michael D. Shear, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Expresses Regret for Criticizing
Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (July I4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/us/politics/
ruth-bader-ginsburg-donald-trump-html [https://perma.cc/FPgM-SFL 4 ]; Supreme Court justice
Sonia Solomayor Visits 'Sesame Street' to Talk About Careers (VIDEO), HUFFPOST (Nov. 12, 2012),
https://ww.huffpost.com/entry/supreme-court-justice-sonia-sotomayor-sesame-streetn2
I I 3625
[https://perma.cc/QLT 7 -VSXA]; Justice Scalia on the Record, CBS 6o MINUTES (Sept. 12, 2008),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-scalia-on-the-record
[https://perma.cc/GFM 9 -NPCY].
Many of the modern Justices have appeared on C-SPAN, see RICH ARD DAVIS, JUSTICES AND
JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE MEDIA 173-74 (2011), but given C-SPAN's
reputation as the boring channel reporting on government generally, these appearances are
distinguishable from appearances on news shows, especially on partisan channels like Fox News.
Justice Douglas appears to be the only precursor to today's celebrity Justices. See Hasen, supra
note 9, at 16o.
22. Richard Wolf, 'The People's Justice': Aler Decade on Supreme Couri, Sonia Solomayor Is Most
Outspoken on Bench and Off, USA TODAY (Aug. I2, 2019, 6:18 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/ 201 /o8/o8/j ustice-sonia-sotomayor-supreme-court-liberal-hispanic-decade
-bench/1882245001 [https://perma.cc/AXF 4 -7 ZEY].
23.
SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD (2013); CLARENCE THOMAS, MY
GRANDFATHER'S SON (2007).

24.

NuIL M. GORSUCI1, JANE Ni'zu & DAVID FVDR, AREPUmLIC, IFYOU CAN KEEP I1 6-7 (2019).
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confirmation hearings.25 Half the Justices are lionized and adulated at
Federalist Society conferences, and the other half at American Constitution
Society conferences.21
This publicity for individual Justices represents a significant change. Two
decades ago, Justices worked in relative obscurity, much like most court of
appeals judges today and judges in many other countries.27 Few Americans
knew the Justices' names: only 24 percent could name a single Justice and
only six percent knew the name of the ChiefJustice.28 To the extent that the
public was interested in the Court at all, it was mostly as an institution rather
than as individual Justices. The Justices largely wrote for, and spoke to, legal
audiences. Now their celebrity extends to the broader public and is more like
a personality cult. By 2018, almost half the population could name at least
one Justice.29 Today, the Court's Justices are viewed as star players on their
respective political teams.
C.

CONNECTING CELEBRITYJUSTICTS AND

COURTDYSFUNCTIONALITY

Celebrity status is not only an under-appreciated problem in itself, it also
contributes to several of the dysfunctional aspects of the current Court.30 First,
25.
Virginia Lamp Thomas, Breaking Silenre, PEOPLE (Nov. 11, 1991, 12:00 PM), https://
people.com/archive/cover-story-breaking-silence-vol-36-no-18 [https://perma.cc/6R 7 K-HV 5 S].
26. See Adam Liptak, Justices Get Out More, but Calendars Aren't Open to Just Anyone, N.Y. TIMES
(June i, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2o15/o6/o2/us/politics/justices-get-out-more-butcalendars-arent-open-to-just-anyone.html [https://perina.cc/AZ 5 8-F 7 Z8]. This is a change from
prior norms; as late as 2006 one scholar could write that only a "small minority" of judges
participated actively in organizations such as the Federalist Society or the American Constitution
Society. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND TI IEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEI IAVIOR
1 29 (2006). The Judicial Conference's Committee on Codes of Conduct has recently circulated
a draft advisory opinion suggesting that judges should not be members of either the Federalist
Society or the American Constitution Society. See COMM. ON CODES OF CONDUCT, ADVISORY
OPINION No. 117: JUDGES' INVOLVEMENT WII I TIIE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIFlY, 'IIIE
FEDERALIST SOCIETY, AND THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 7 (2020), http://eppc.org/
wp-content/uploads/ 2020/01/Guide-Volo2B-Cho2-AdvOp 11 7 2o0GC-ETH-2o20-o1-20-EXPi.pdf [https://perma.cc/RDX3-6T96]. The draft opinion has been highly criticized. See, e.g.,
Susan Crabtree, Citis: Senate Ready to Fight Draft Rule Targeting FederalistSociety, REiALCLEAR POL.
(Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/20o2/or /24/rulechangevould_
ban judges_federalistsocietynenbershipa 4 223o.html [https://perma.cc/RSK-YC 3 G]. In
any case, the Codes of Conduct do not currently apply to Supreme CourtJustices.
27.

See NUNO GAROUPA & TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REPU1TATION: A COMPARATIVE THEORY

28-29 (2015) (describing judges of UK, France, Japan, and Germany as "anonymous").
28.
In 1989, only 24 percent of Americans could name at least one Justice other than the
Chief, and in 1995 only six percent could name the Chief Justice. Washing/on Post Poll: Supreme
Cour, Ques/ion 6, WASH. POST (June 14, 1989) (on file with author); Trust in Government Survey
[rr/28/r995-r2/4/1995,HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 28, 1995) (on file with author).
29.

See ROBERT GREEN & ADAM ROSENBLATT, C-SPAN/PSB SUPREME COURT SURVEY: AGENDA

OF KEY FINDINGS 7 (2o18), https://static.c-span.org/assets/documents/scotusSurvey/CSPAN%

2oPSB%202018%2oSupreme%2oCourt%20Survey%2oAgenda%200f%20Key%2oFindings% 2
oFINAL%208%2027.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q 4 E2-G 5 N2].
30.
A handful of commentators have noticed the phenomenon but have drawn different
(and limited) conclusions from it. See Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme
Cour's Cull of Cele/nity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1255, 1259, 1284 (2o1o) (concluding that it causes
"political activism" and "adventurous"judging); Hasen, supra note 9, at 170 ("[T]he controversies
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it directly undermines public confidence in the impartiality of the Court and
its Justices. As Justice Aharon Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court has pointed
out, public confidence rests on the belief thatjudges are acting as judges; and
that belief in turn depends on judges who understand that judging "is a way
of life that does not include the pursuit of material wealth or publicity."3'
Unseemly celebrity-seeking by Supreme Court Justices raises the suspicion
that their actions are self-serving rather than evidence of a commitment to
impartial judging and the rule of law.
Second, the seductiveness of fame indirectly changes the public's view of
the Court. It creates incentives for Justices to maintain and enhance their
standing with their adoring (and ideologically polarized) followers and to
create a lasting legacy both with and beyond their judicial opinions. In other
words, they play to their fans. This attention-seeking leads them to author
more separate opinions and write more intemperately, increasing both the
number of opinions and at least the appearance of polarization. They write
for their polarized base, not for lawyers or even the general public.
The media take notice, and, in translating the Court's opinions for the
public, highlight the negative and political aspects of the Court. Recent
confirmation hearings and the public reactions to them are a prime example
of both a cause and an effect of this perception of polarization. The
perception also endangers the Court's legitimacy, as Justice Kagan has
recently pointed out.,, The danger to legitimacy is especially sharp when their
outside activities telegraph their views on important constitutional questions,
leading the public to believe that the Justices have prejudged the issues on the
basis of their political views.33 Eventually, as Stephen Burbank argues, the

thatJustices spark can undermine public confidence in the Supreme Court."); Posner, supra note
2, at 305 (concluding that "there are no consequences" to Justices' increased celebrity); Hasen,
supra note 13 (concluding that "cult-like worship can only make the assured even surer in
their convictions"); Jeffrey Rosen, Judicial Exposure, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2006), https://
www.nytimes.com/2oo6/o1/29/books/review/judicial-exposure.html
[https://perma.cc/
QMC 4 -BRW 9 ] (stating that Justices courting celebrity status might "squander the sense of
impersonal respect on which their legitimacy depends"). Most of the discussion of Justices as
celebrities has occurred-where else?-online, in short pithy posts designed for maximum
impact rather than careful exploration. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 13; Jonathan Turley, Ruth
Bader Ginsbung and the Problem of Celebrity Justices, HIL (Sept. 2, 2018, 6:oo PM), https://
thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/40478 4 -ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-the-problem-of-celebrity-justices
[https://penna.cc/Z2LV- 5 ABB].
3 1 . AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY I i O (2006).
32.
Sophie Tatum, Justice Kagan Worries About the 'Legitimacy' of a Politically Divided
Supreme Cout, CNN (Oct. 5, 2018, 10:o6 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/05/politics/
supreme-court-elena-kagan-legitimacy/index.html [https://pera.cc/EgVF-92C6] ("Part of the
court's legitimacy depends on people not seeing the court in the way that people see the rest of
the governing structures of this country now. In other words, people thinking of the court as not
politically divided in the same way, as not an extension of politics, but instead somehow above
the fray.").
For example, the autobiographies of Justices Sotomayor and Thomas are unequivocal
33.
about their personal views of affirmative action (in different directions). See, e.g., Ti10MAs, supra
note 23, at 54-57, 74-75 (criticizing affirmative action programs at Holy Cross and Yale Law
School, his alma maters); SOTOMAYOR, supranote 23, at 145-47 (describing affirmative action at
Princeton, her alma mater, as necessary but not sufficient); id. at 188-89 (describing her
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public's diffuse support for the Court (that is, support independent of its
particular decisions34) will be replaced by support that depends on individual
decisions, and "the people [will] ask of the judiciary not, 'What does the law
require?' but rather, 'What have you done for me lately?'", We are already
seeing the beginning of this transformation in public reaction to individual
Justices' decisions: Conservatives lambasted Justice Gorsuch as a traitor to the
cause for upholding LGBTQ rights.36
In short, when Justices play to their base, popular reactions to the Court
and its decisions begin to resemble popular reactions to politics generally.
People become what one political scientist has labeled "hooligans":
Hooligans are the rabid sports fans of politics. They have strong and
largely fixed worldviews. They .

.

. consume political information,

although in a biased way. They tend to seek out information that
confirms their preexisting political opinions, but ignore, evade, and
reject out of hand evidence that contradicts or disconfirms their
preexisting opinions.... For them, belonging to the Democrats or
Republicans, Labor or Tories, Social Democrats or Christian
Democrats matter to their self-image in the same way being a
Christian or Muslim matters to religious people's self-image. They
tend to despise people who disagree with them, holding that people

&

&

defending affirmative action to a law-firm partner). Even a cursory perusal of Justice Scalia's
speeches gives the reader his views on pretty much everything.
34.
For a discussion of diffuse and specific support, see, for example, James L. Gibson
Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Sunwme Court: Conventional Wisdoms, and Recent
Challenges Thereto, 1o ANN. Rvv. L. & Soc. Scn. 201, 204-05 (2014). The relationship between
specific and diffuse legitimacy is contested. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The
Etiology of Publi Suppor for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. Sc. 635, 636 (1992) (arguing that
specific policy disagreement does not directly diminish diffuse support); Brandon L. Bartels
Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundationsof Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American
Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 197 (2013) (arguing that specific policy disagreement does directly
diminish diffuse support); see also BAUM, sulra note 26, at 65 ("[W] e do not have a clear picture
of... the impact of the Court's decisions on diffuse support for the Court.").
35.

Stephen B. Burbank, Judiciallndependence, JudicialAccounability, andInter/anc/hRelations,

95 GEo. L.J. 909, 916 (2007).

36.
The case is Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (o2o). For reactions, see, for
example, Jeremy Stahl, ConservativeActivists and Pundils are MellingDown Over Gorsuch'sEmbrace of
LGBTQ Rights, SLATE (June 15, 2020, 2:04 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2o2o/
o6/carrie-severino-meltdown-neil-gorsuch-gbtq-rights.html
[https://perma.cc/K 7 TC-HTFW]
(describing "activists [as] feeling betrayed" and including a tweet from a prior Gorsuch supporter
calling him "an imposter"); Howard Kurtz, Gorsuch Draws PersonalAttacks for Breaking Ranks on Gay
Rights, Fox NEws June 17, 4o1o), https://www.foxnews.com/media/gorsuch-draws-personalattacks-for-breaking-ranks-on-gay-rights [https://penna.cc/E 5 QF-YJ 7 D] (describing comments
including accusations that Gorsuch was "appealing to college campuses and editorial boards");
Josh Hammer, Neil Gorsuch Slapped Conservatives by Creating New Gay Rights, N.Y. PosT (June 15,
2020, 8:28 PM), https://nypost.com/2oo/o6/15/neil-gorsuch-slapped-conservatives-bycreating-new-gay-rights [https://penna.cc/DMW8- 4 9NZ] (calling Bostock a "blow ...
delivered
from the Federalist Society-vetted Neil Gorsuch"); and Hadley Arkes, A Morally Empty
furisprudence, FIRST THINGS (June 17, 2020), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/
202o/o6/a-morally-empty-jurisprudence [https://perma.cc/ 5 WFM- 5 VRZ] (calling Gorsuch's
vote a "defection").
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with alternative worldviews are stupid, evil, selfish, or at best, deeply
misguided.37
So some people "know" that an opinion written by Justice Scalia must be
wrong and others believe the same thing if the opinion is written by Justice
Ginsburg. Over the last decade, the number of Americans who could name at
least one Supreme Court Justice has increased while the number who could
name at least one Supreme Court case has decreased. 8 Who decides is more
important than what they decide. Public consumption of the Supreme Court's
output begins to mirror public consumption of polarized news outlets:
Republicans believe Fox News and Democrats believe NPR.3 The Court
becomes just another place where the home team, the good guys, battle
against the evil other.
The lure of celebrity (and the resulting plethora of separate opinions)
may also reduce decisional deliberation and compromise among the Justices
themselves. John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino have suggested that
"internal and external deliberation are at least partly in conflict."V To the
extent that Justices are engaged in public debates (whether through their
separate opinions or otherwise), they may be reluctant to engage in internal
deliberation and unwilling to compromise.4
And when Justices aim their opinions directly at their zealous fans, it
affects not only what they write and how they write it but whether they write
at all. As an example of choosing to write in order to play to the base, consider
Morris County Board of Chosen Freeholdersv. Freedomfrom Religion Foundation.42 In
this case the Supreme Court declined to review a state supreme court decision
upholding, against First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges, a state law
prohibiting historic preservation grants for religious buildings. Justice
Kavanaugh, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch, issued a "statement
...
respecting the denial of certiorari."4, The statement reads like either a
dissent from the denial or an opinion on the merits. It cites numerous
precedents as creating and applying a "bedrock principle of religious
equality,"44 and analogizes the state law at issue to other state statutes
previously invalidated. It suggests that deciding in favor of petitioners (against
the state law) "should not be ... difficult."45 And it closes by saying that the
state law "raise [s] serious questions under this Court's precedents and the

JASON BRENNAN, AGAINST DEMOCRACY 5 (2016). Brennan argues that about half of
37.
American citizens are hooligans. Id. at 24.
38.
See GREEN & ROSENBLATT, supa note 29, at 6, 27.
39.
See CASs R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 52-53 (2007) (describing study).
40.
John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Conslitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82
TEx. L. REv. 167', 1698 (2004).
41.
Id. at 1698, 1700.
42.

Morris Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Freedom from Religion Found., 139 S. Ct.

909, 910-11 (2019).

43.

Id. at gog.

44.

Id. at

45.

Id. at 911.
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Constitution's fundamental guarantee of equality."4 6 Less than a month later,
Justice Kavanaugh cited his own "statement" in Morris County Board for the
proposition that "[t]he government may not discriminate against religion
generally or against particular religious denominations."47
But Justices Kavanaugh, Alito, and Gorsuch in fact agreed that certiorari
should be denied in Morris County Board, primarily because "the factual
details" were not clear.48 In that case, why write at all? A similar question can
be asked about Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in Box v. Planned
Parenthoodof Indianaand Kentucky.49 The Seventh Circuit had struck down two
provisions of Indiana's law restricting abortion. A divided Court-with Justice
Thomas in the majority-issued a per curiam opinion remanding one
provision and denying certiorari on the other.Justice Thomas agreed with the
cert denial on the ground that the Court should wait until other courts of
appeals confronted the same issue (a ban on abortions sought for reasons of
gender, race, or disability). He nevertheless wrote a 20-page opinion linking
proponents of eugenics-especially its racist aspects-with the birth control
movement of the early twentieth century, and then arguing that abortion is
also a eugenicist tool. None of the opinion was relevant to what the Court,
with Thomas' agreement, actually decided.
The most plausible answer to why these Justices spent time drafting
irrelevant opinions is that they were both explaining to their political acolytes
why this was not a betrayal despite appearances, and assuring those acolytes
that the Justices will vote the right way when a case actually comes before the
Court. They also seem to be encouraging their political compatriots to bring
such a case to the Court. These excess opinions can read like breadcrumbs
left as directions for future plaintiffs. The Court then becomes, more and
more, just another political forum for partisan battles.
Achieving and maintaining celebrity status thus creates an insidious
version of what was once dubbed the Greenhouse effect. In its original
version, the Greenhouse effect-named after longtime New York Times
Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse-was said to cause Justices to
drift leftward as they rubbed shoulders with, and emulated or sought
approval from, Washington's liberal elite.5° In today's version-call it the
Hannity-Maddow effect-each Justice emulates or seeks the approval of his

46.

J.,

Id.

47.
Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475, 1475 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
48. Morris Cnty. Bd., 1 3 9 S. Ct. at 91.
49.
Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1782-93 (2o 19) (Thomas,
concurring).

50.
See DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 6, at 89-91; BAUM, supra note 26, at 139-55. The effect
was probably mythical. Devins and Baum suggest that the "Greenhouse effect" writ large might
have played some role but was unlikely to have been the only factor. DEVINS & BAUM, spranote
6, at 95-101. One study suggests that most Justices appointed between 1937 and 1 993 drifted,
some to the left and some to the right (and a few "in more exotic ways"). Lee Epstein, Andrew D.
Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, IdeologicalDriftAmong Supremre Coti Justices: Who, When,
and IHow Jmportant?, 101 Nw. U. L. RIv. 1483, 1504 (2007).
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or her own ideologically-polarized in-group. Today's celebrity Justices are not
drifting; they are firmly anchored at opposite ends of the political spectrum.
And part of what keeps them anchored is the adulation from the base, as they
dig in their heels to prove their loyalty and steadfastness.
The effects I am describing are a form of-or at least analogous
to-group polarization. To the extent that the Justices' social identities are
predicated on being members of particular groups, their views are likely to
become both more polarized and more extreme as a way of differentiating
themselves from other groups.51 Or, as Cass Sunstein puts it, "[w] hen people
find themselves in groups of like-minded types, they are especially likely to
move to extremes."52 When Justices seek, and find, celebrity status among a
polarized fan base, they are essentially increasing the extent to which they
interact with like-minded groups (and concomitantly decreasing the extent to
which they interact with others). They effectively "sort themselves into
enclaves in which their own views and commitments are constantly
reaffirmed."5.
Judicial polarization becomes a larger problem when coupled with the
modern trend of declining institutional loyalty (and the concomitant
increased emphasis on individual reputation instead).54 Justices seeking to
enhance their own reputations ignore the potential effect on the institutional
legitimacy and reputation of the Court. They overinvest in their individual
reputations at the expense of the reputation of the judiciary as a whole. The
effect on the Court is more detrimental the more that individual reputations
are dependent on the approval of divergent groups with little or nothing in
common. The result is a Court even more dysfunctional than most critics
realize.
Celebrity status is certainly not the only cause of the current dysfunctions,
but it exacerbates them and creates exactly the wrong incentive structure.
Justices have little or no incentive to collaborate or cooperate. Compromise
is off the table because while it enhances the institutional reputation of the
Court, it weakens the individual reputations of the Justices. Celebrity status
makes it in the best interests of all the Justices to act like independent
contractors competing for business by advertising the purity of their brand.
Dysfunctionality is inevitable when Justices care more about themselves than

51.

See, e.g., CHARLES STANGOR, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 4 8 7 - 9 o (1st
supra note 39, at 23 i n.I 9.

Int'l ed.

201 1); SUNSIIN,

52.
CAss R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: How LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 2 (2009)
(emphasis omitted).
53. SUNSTEIN, supra note 39, at xii.
This phenomenon is not limited to the judiciary. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W.
54.
Morrison, Ijistorical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 1 26 HARV. L. REv. 411, 443 (201 2) ("party
affiliation" is a much better prediction of policy stance than is "institutional identity"); Daryl J.
Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2323
(2006) (government officials are motivated by "partisan goals" and "indifferent to the powers
and interests of the branches"); David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in
ConsljtutionalLaw, 85 U. Cii. L. REV. 1, 4 (2018) ("[P]artisan and ideological loyalty often eclipse
institutional loyalty .... ").
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about the Court as an institution. If we can change the incentives and reduce
the ability (or the temptation) to seek celebrity status, we might be able to
make the Court at least somewhat less dysfunctional. The next Part turns to
possible solutions.
III. How Do WE Fix IT?
Many scholars have offered proposals to repair the broken Court. Before
I turn to my own suggestion, I should explain why these other proposals are
insufficient. The most common reason is that they are aimed at solving only
part of the problem. None would have any effect on celebrity status or change
the Justices' attention-seeking incentives, and are unlikely-for that reason as
well as others-to solve the Court's dysfunctions.
First, however, I must consider the possibility that no external solution is
needed. One response to the Court's "crisis of legitimacy" is that because the
problem is of the justices' making, they should be the ones to fix it. A number
of commentators have suggested that one or more justices should "moderate"
their views, voting contrary to their true positions in order to make the Court's
decisions seem less polarized and more palatable to a majority of citizens.55
They often point to purported historical examples ofJustices doing just that,
from Justice Owen Roberts' "switch in time"5s to Chief Justice John Roberts'
vote in NFIB v. Sibelius.57 A slightly different version of that approach is the
Screws rule, named after a case in which Justice Rutledge voted contrary to his
own legal views in order to avoid having a case without any majorityjudgment
at all.58 But, as Tara Leigh Grove has pointed out, voting contrary to one's
belief about what the law requires is "deeply troubling" because it is
inconsistent with our norms of adjudication and thus lacks what Richard
Fallon has labeled "legal legitimacy."59 Moreover, we cannot expectJustices to
deviate from their current individual preferences for a highly speculative

See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court's Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240,
55.
2243 n.16 (2019) (reviewing FALLON, supranote 9).
56. BARRY CUSIMAN, RETIlINKING 'TIiv Nuw DEAL CoURT: Tii SIRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUITIONAL REVOLUTION 3-5 (1998) (describing and critiquing the idea that Roberts
changed his vote for political reasons).
57. See generally Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 5 6 7 U.S. 519 (2012) (upholding the
individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act under the taxing power while limiting
the reach of Congress' Commerce Clause power and striking down the Medicaid expansion
provision). For skepticism about whether these are in fact examples ofJustices voting contrary to
their own views, see Grove, supra note 55, at 2255
58. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring). For a
discussion of other Justices' similar votes, see Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARv. L.
REv. 1942, 1998-2000 (24019).
59.
Grove, supra note 55, at 2262-63 (following FALLON, sipra note 9, at 165). See generally
Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REv. 987 (2008) (defending judicial duty of
"sincerity" or "truth-telling"). Re defends the use of the Screws rule against such a charge on the
ground that it "applies only ... when a Justice believes that she can more fully or reliably achieve
outcomes consistent with her own legal views by voting against those views." Re, supra note 58, at 1999.
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celebrity. We therefore must look outside the Court for solutions.
A.

OiiER SCHOLARS' SOLUT1ONS

The most common suggestion is term limits for Supreme CourtJustices.
Proponents suggest that by giving every president an equal opportunity to
name Supreme Court Justices, term limits would reduce the stakes of
confirmation hearings and make compromise more likely. That might be
true, but it might also cause presidents to choose the most extreme nominees
they can find in order to maximize the extent of their influence. It might also
mean that the Supreme Court becomes an issue for every presidential election,
further politicizing the process.2 In addition, one study suggests that term
limits would increase doctrinal instability.63 Most important, however, is that
imposing term limits would not change the incentives of the Justices
themselves to seek approval from their ideologically homogeneous fan base
and thus would not reduce any of the problems I have identified (other than,
possibly, the confirmation mess). Indeed, a term-limited Justice might instead
try to make the most of his or her short time in office by courting favor even
more assiduously-especially if he or she might want a post-retirement

6o.

See BAUM, supra note 26, at 65-66.

61.

See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 310-12 (2014);

SANFORD

LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC

CONST'TUToN

123-39 (2006);

REFORMING TIlE

COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SIPREME COURT JUSTICES 127 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington

eds., 2006); Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Couri: Li/e Tenure
Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 769, 771-76 (2006); James E. DiTullio & John B.
Schochet, Note, Saving This Honorable Courl: A Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court
with Slaggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-Year Terus, go VA. L. REV. 1093, 1094-98 (2004). The
proposal apparently has broad bipartisan public support. See STAN GREENBERG, JAMES CARVIILE,
ERICA SEIFERT, ANDREW BAUMANN & JAMES HAZZARD, DEMOCRACY CORPS, BROAD BI-PARTISAN
CONSENSUS SUPPORTS REFORMS TO SUPREME COURT: AMERICANS VIEW COURT AS TOO POLITICAL
1, 3 (2014),
https://democracycorps.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/DCorps-SCOTUSMemo-FINAL-o 5 0614.pdf [https://perma.cc/P 4 T-YJEX]. Thomas Jefferson actually first
proposed term limits back in 1822 after concluding that life tenure was inconsistent with the
American republic. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William T. Barry (July 2, 1822), in 7 TIlE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: BEING HIS AUTOBIOGRAPIIY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS,
MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND OTHER WRITINGS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 255, 256 (H.A. Washington

ed., 1854).
62.
For support for the conclusion that term limits would increase rather than decrease the
contentiousness of the appointment process (and would consequently undermine the Supreme
Court's legitimacy), see Stephen B. Burbank, Alleirnative CareerResolution 11: Changingthe Tenure of
Supreme Court Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1511, 1542-44 (2006). As Devins and Baum point out,
changes in the role of ideology in the appointments process also means that "presidential
elections will become even more important for the Court than they have been throughout
American history." DEVINS & BAUM, sulra note 6, at 156; see also Charles M. Cameron, Jonathan
P. Kastellec & Lauren A. Mattioli, Presidential Selection of Supreme Court Nominees: The
Characteristics Approach, 1, 2 (July 18, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=32167 5 7 [https://perma.cc/DTQ9-W7 4 Y] (suggesting that it is easier now than in
the past for presidents to find "ideologically reliable candidates").
63. See generally Christopher Sundby & Suzanna Sherry, Tenn Limits and Turmoil: Roe v.
Wade's Whiplash, 98 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2019) (using computer simulations to model judicial
voting on abortion rights after 1973 under a hypothetical regime of i8-year term limits).
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position at a political or quasi-political entity.> In short, imposing term limits
would undercut the very real benefits of lifetime tenure for judges: Judges
without life tenure are less likely to act independently of the political branches
or of public opinion, as both the Founding generation and modern scholars
have recognized.5 Term-limited Justices would not as effectively serve their
primary function in our constitutional democracy: to hold the tyranny of the
majority in check.
Another possibility is to reinstate circuit riding by Justices, which I
suggested more than a decade ago and others have proposed subsequently.66
That might help if, as I once thought, the primary cause of Supreme Court
dysfunction was that the Justices thought of themselves as constitutional
demigods: Exposing them to a broader range of legal questions might
disabuse them of that misapprehension. Unfortunately, the problem is
broader and deeper, reflecting not only the Justices' own views of their exalted
status but also their stardom. Forcing them to ride circuit might take them
down a peg, but it would not reduce their incentive to seek adulation from
their base.6 7 Again, it might even increase it as they chafe against sharing the
obligations of mere ordinaryjudges. Or riding circuit might give them even
more of an opportunity to be seen, heard, and adored.
One partial solution might be to change the confirmation process by
imposing a supermajority requirement for confirmation. That might yield

64.
See GAROUPA & GINSBURG, supra note 27, at 40 (suggesting that "private sector
opportunities after retirement" lead to "branding" attempts by judges).
65.
See, e-g, THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1902)
(explaining life tenure for judges is "the best expedient which can be devised in any government
to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws"); 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORYOF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 495 (MerrillJensen ed., 1976) ("The servile
dependence of the judges . .. has happened [when their] appointment has been for a less period
than during good behavior ... for if every five or seven years, the judges are obliged to make
court for a reappointment to office, they cannot be styled independent."); Brian T. Fitzpatrick,
The Cons/ilulionality of FederalJurisdiction-Sripping
Legisla/ion and the Hisloy of Slale Judicial Selection
and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839, 853 (24012) ("[I]f the judge has life tenure, it is thought that the
judge will feel free to enforce constitutional restrictions on public preferences. [But] if the judge
has to come before the public or even elected officials periodically, it is thought that the judge
may not feel so free."); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branchesin Separalionof Powers Law,
150 U. PA. L. REv. 603, 624-25 (200 ') ("[T] he judicial power is vested in the judiciary because
its decisionmakers have protections that assure their independence-lifetime tenure and
salary."). See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of
Article III fudges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965 (2007) (defending lifetime tenure as a necessary safeguard of
judicial independence).
66.
Suzanna Sherry, Politics and Judgment, 70 Mo. L. REV. 973, 986 (2005) [hereinafter
Sherry, Politics]; DANIEL A. FARBER & SIUZANNA SHERRY,

IN CONSTITUTIONAL

JUDGMENT

CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS

LAW 120 (2oog); see also Lerner & Lund, supra note 30, at 1295-99-

67.
The same might be said of enlarging the Court's mandatory jurisdiction, which I and
others have also suggested. See sources cited supra note 66; Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The
Lottery Docket, i16 MICiI. L. REV. 705, 731 & n. 172 (2o 18); Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme
Court's Agenda: Is There a PlaceforCertification?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1310, 1323 n.74 (o o);
Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, JudicialIndependence in Excess: Reviving thefudicialDuly
of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNEIIL L. REv. 587, 591 (2009).
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more centrist judges and reduce polarization on the Court,68 but unless it
eliminated ideological diversity altogether it would not change the Justices'
incentives. And given the Senate's recent elimination of the filibuster for
judicial appointments,6 9 a supermajority requirement seems highly unlikely
to be adopted.
Finally, no one has suggested the most directly responsive approach: Stop
the Justices from speaking, writing books, or otherwise communicating other
than through their published opinions. Of course, the First Amendment
forecloses that option.
Other scholars have made suggestions that are designed to solve different
problems, and thus are unlikely to have any effect on the problems I have
identified. For example, some scholars have suggested imposing a
supermajority requirement before the Supreme Court invalidates an act of
Congress.7w This suggestion, however, is primarily offered in response to a
perception of too much 'judicial activism," and "activism" is not the
problem.7, Requiring a supermajority might reduce the number of federal
laws struck down as unconstitutional, but it would not change the Justices'
politically-polarized behavior.
Some commentators are resurrecting the possibility of Court-packing if
the Democrats win back Congress and the presidency, this time to solve the
perceived problem of an overly conservative Court.72 The problem with this
suggestion, of course, is that it has a political valence and for that reason
would inevitably lead to escalating retaliation the next time the government
changes hands. It would also play directly into the public perception of the
Court as just another political institution, vulnerable to the usual political
manipulation.
Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman have recently made two truly novel
proposals.73 The first is to appoint all court of appeals judges as Supreme
CourtJustices and then have random panels of nine sit as the Supreme Court
for two weeks at a time.> The second is to create a politically balanced
Supreme Court by making five Democratic Justices and five Republican
68.
See, e.g., Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 40, at 1702-03. See generally John O. McGinnis
& Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDozo L.
REv. 543 (2005) (describing likely consequences of adopting such a rule).
For a description of the two-part (and two-party) elimination of the filibuster, with
69.
Democrats eliminating it for lower-court appointments in 2013 and Republicans eliminating it
for Supreme Court nominees in 2017, see Josh Chafetz, Unpieredenied iJudicialConfirmalionBaldes
and theSearchifor a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 105-09 (2017).
70.
See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference
on lie Supreme Cour, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 951 (2003). One scholar makes a similar suggestion
about overturning precedent. See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Rest World, 103 CALIF.
L. REV. 1139, 1175 (2015).
71.
See Suzanna Sherry, Why We Need More Judicial Aclivism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM,
ExECImvE POWER, AND THE SPIRIT OFMODERATION I1, 11-1 2 (Giorgi Areshidze, Paul O. Carrese
& Suzanna Sherry eds., 2016).
72.
See Sitaraman & Epps, supranote 12, at 164 n.64.

73.
74.

Id. at 181-202.
Id. at 181.
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Justices agree (unanimously) on five additional justices, chosen from among
sitting lower-court judges, to sit for a year at a time-under pain of lacking a
quorum if they cannot agree on the five new judges.75 These proposals are
unlikely to reduce either polarization or attention-seeking byJustices, but will
simply create balance between the polarized extremes. The failure to address
polarization (or attention-seeking) is unsurprising: The authors are essentially
proposing a second-best approach to solving a different problem. The
problem, according to Epps and Sitaraman, is a nomination process "in which
the Court has become a political football, and in which each nominee can be
expected to predictably vote along ideological lines."7 6 In particular, they are
worried about the damage to the Court "by clashes between the conservative
majority and progressive politicians, if and when Democrats regain power."77
Thus, they see the problem as arising primarily from a broken nomination
process that has produced a conservative Court. And because they see no way
to fix the nomination process, they instead try to fix the conservative Court.
Not only is this a second-best solution, it is also avowedly partisan. It is also
likely to wreak havoc on stability and predictability: In the first scenario,
multiple panels would have little reason to respect the opinions of prior
panels, reducing the stabilizing effect of stare decisis; in the second, there is a
strong possibility that the Court would lack a quorum and be unable to decide
anything at all, leaving circuit splits on crucial issues.
B.

MY SOLwT1ON

The problem with all these proposals is that their authors have either
incorrectly diagnosed the Court's dysfunctional aspects or overlooked
celebrity status as one important cause of the dysfunctionality. And the only
way to reduce the justices' grasping for celebrity is to place it out of reach. To
do that, we have to make it impossible for them to use their official authority
to enhance their own reputations. Taking away the opportunity for them to
write opinions playing to their base removes their primary tool for, and
reduces the efficacy of, extracurricular attention-seeking.
Congress should enact the following into law: For each case, the Court
must issue one, and only one, per curiam opinion. No attribution, no
concurrences or dissents permitted. No one outside the Supreme Court
would know who wrote the opinion or whether the vote was unanimous, five
to four, or anything in between. If five Justices cannot reach agreement on an
opinion, the Court should issue a boilerplate opinion similar to the ones
issued now when the Court is evenly divided: noting that the decision below
is affirmed or reversed (depending on which way the vote goes) but that the
8
Court cannot agree on the reasons why.7

76.

Id. at 193.
Id. at 152.

77.

Id.

75.

78.
If there is more than one issue in the case, each issue can be treated separately; the per
curiam opinion might, for example, analyze one issue but declare that no majority opinion could
be written regarding a second issue. My proposal would also require changes in how opinions
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The Practical Benefits of Single Unsigned Opinions

Such a law would have a number of salutary effects on the current
dysfunctions. One probable result would be enhanced authority and
legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the public. By speaking with one voice,
the Court increases its authority as an institution, as both John Marshall and
Earl Warren recognized.79 As Judge Learned Hand put it, "disunity cancels
the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of
judges so largely depends." s Thomas Jefferson also recognized the power of
a unitary voice: Seeking to diminish the Court's-and Marshall's-power, he
advocated a return to the English tradition of seriatim opinions 8 1 More
recently, Chief Justice Roberts has suggested that "closely divided, 5-4
decisions make it harder for the public to respect the Court as an impartial
institution that transcends partisan politics."82 Public opinion polls bear this
out. One poll found that people are more likely to agree with and accept
unanimous decisions than divided rulings, even when they are ideologically
predisposed against the result,83 while another found that a majority of
Americans believe that a 5-4 decision carries less precedential weight than a
unanimous one.a Even lower courts are less likely to comply with a majority
opinion if there is also a concurring opinion that criticizes the majority
opinion.85 Decisions that include a concurring opinion are also more likely to
are announced from the bench; the Court could make clear that the Justice announcing the
judgment and reading excerpts from the opinion is not necessarily the Justice who wrote it. The
early ChiefJustices apparently announced opinions that they did not author (and might not have
agreed with). See G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-Centwy
Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1463, 1467-69, 1474 (2006).
79.
See JOHN V. ORTH, How MANY JUDGES DOES IT TAKE TO MAKE A SUPREME COURT? 34-37,

5w

(2006) (Marshall, and univocal opinions generally); BERNARD SCIIWART%, SUPER CinEF: EARL
WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT 89-90, o 5-06, 305 (' 983) (Warren and the importance of a
single opinion in segregation cases); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 679, 683 (1976) (same);
see also SALAMONE, supra note 7, at 46-50 (describing concerns of these and other Justices about
the effect of Court divisions on public perception).
So. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGhITS 72 (1958).
8i.
ORTII, supra note 79, at 35-36 & n.43; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and
Disagreemeni on the Suprene Court, 100 CORNELL L. REv. 769, 787-88 (2015) (providing Thomas
Jefferson's views).
82.
Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts's Rules, AILANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2007), https:/www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2oo7/o 1 /robertss-rules/305559 [https://perma.cc/W33C-EWG2].
83.
James R. Zink, James F. Spriggs II & John T. Scott, Courting the Public: The Influence of
Decision Attributes on Individuals' Views of Court Opinions, 71 J. POLITICS 909, 923 (2009).
84.
Jamieson & Hennessy, supra note 8, at goo; see infra note 87 and accompanying text. But
see SAIAMONE, supra note 7, at 17-50 (noting that the level of division has no negative effect and
may have a positive effect on public acceptance); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester
Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People Accepi Public Policies They Oppose? Tesling Legitimacy Theory with a
Survey-Based Experiment, 58 PoL. RES. Q. 187, 197 (2005) (stating that the level of division has no
effect on public acceptance).
85. PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON TILE U.S. SUPREME COURT 73,
84-86 (2o i o); see also Thomas B. Bennett, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin & Susan Navarro
Smecler, Divide & Concur: Separale Opinions & Legal Change, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 853-58
(2018) (noting that lower court judges often rely on such concurrences even though they are
not supposed to have precedential effect).
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be overruled by the Supreme Court itself.86 And making the unitary voice
anonymous and hiding the number ofJustices who agree with it magnifies the
perception of the Court as an institution rather than as a collection of
individuals. Finally, without attribution, concurrences, or dissents-or even a
vote count-the media and the public would be less likely to disparage
particular decisions as political or ideological.17 It would no longer be possible
to dismiss an opinion out of hand just because it was written by a member of
the "wrong" side-no one would know who wrote it. Just as the presence of
dissenting opinions makes it more likely that Congress will override a statutory
ruling by the Court, 8 dissensus draws the negative attention of the media and
the public; eliminating it might reduce that negative attention.
More important for my purposes, limiting the Court to a single unsigned
opinion would have an effect on the Justices' views of their roles, their
opportunities to embellish their reputations, and their incentives. The link
between how Justices view their roles and opinion-writing norms is complex.
But one scholar has marshalled the historical record of separate opinions to
suggest that beginning in the late Taney era, Justices began to think of the
Court as atomistic rather than unified.89 This spurred a change in separate
opinions: Although they remained rare until the 1940s, the reasons Justices
gave for writing separately changed. Earlier separate opinions stressed the
importance of the case; later ones focused on individual Justices "defending
their own judicial records" by refusing to be associated with the majority
opinion.', Similarly, another commentator has suggested that repeated
dissents on the same issue represent a Justice's "elevating his individual
jurisprudence (and perhaps individual legacy?)" over "coherence in the
Court's doctrine."9' It follows that limiting the ability to write separately might
diminish concern for individual reputation and reinvigorate the notion of a
unified rather than atomistic Court.
More practically, prohibiting attribution and separate opinions would
drastically reduce the opportunity for Justices to play to their bases. They
would not be able to use concurrences or dissents to signal their intentions
for the next case, snipe at their colleagues, or otherwise fly their liberal or
conservative colors. They could, of course, continue to do so off the bench,

86. See FORREST MAI: ZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAI IIIECK, CRAFTING LAW ON It IE
SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 68 (2000).
87.
See MICIIAEL A. Zius, TILE LIMITS OF LEGITIMACY: DISSENTING OPINIONS, MEDIA
COVERAGE, AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 25 (201 5) (noting that media
coverage is more negative when the Court is divided); SALAMONE, supra note 7, at 66-116, 148
-49 (stating that media coverage of divided decisions is more likely to use ideological or political
language).
88.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., OverridingSup rne Cour Statutory Interpreiation Derisions, 101
AT: E . 331, 349-51 (1991i)8g. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790-1945,

77

WAsiI. U. L.Q. 137, 139 (1999).
90.
Id. at 153; see also id. at 157-58 (examples from the Taney Court); id. at 166-70
(examples from 1864-1940).
91.
Allison Orr Larsen, PerpetualDissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 447, 469 (2008).

IOWA LAW REVIEW

200o

[Vol. i1o6:181i

but remarks in unofficial outlets are less notable and carry less weight. Offthe-bench arguments are also more remote in time and space from the
Court's opinion, reducing their efficacy and thus perhaps their frequency.
Reducing the Justices' opportunity to write for their fans is essentially a
way to try to break down what David Fontana and Aziz Huq have called "crossinstitutional [social] networks" in order to generate or reinforce institutional
loyalties.92 The ideologically polarized fan bases that confer celebrity status on
the Justices have at least partially displaced earlier judicial social networks,
including lawyers, law professors, journalists covering the Court, and
colleagues on the Supreme Court and other courts. Those earlier networks
were more likely to value judicial craftsmanship and impartiality over partisan
decision-making.93 Fred Schauer has suggested that beginning about 1980,
"law school culture and legal scholarship" slowly began to value substantive
results over legal craftsmanship.94 I suggest that (much later than 1980), the
Justices themselves began to change insofar as they no longer sought to
impress the traditional, and non-partisan, constituencies. Either way,
disrupting the social networks that encourage bad judicial behavior is one
possible way to change that behavior.
Requiring a single per curiam opinion is also likely to reduce the number
of cases without a majority opinion at all. A justice who agrees with the result
but not the reasoning would have less individual incentive to demur from
joining the putative Court opinion, and more institutional incentive to join.
Conversely, the Justice writing the opinion for the Court will have an incentive
to write it in such a way as to attract at least four others. For both the writing
Justice and the putatively concurring Justice, the alternatives are much more
unattractive than they are currently. My proposal would also alter the
incentives of a writing Justice who already has at least five votes for the result,
because he or she would have to be more attentive to other Justices'
suggestions lest they defect from the opinion even if they are willing to go along
with the result. And those other Justices would also be more insistent that their
own views be included in the Court's per curiam opinion, because they would
not have a good alternative method of expression.
My proposal would likely also reduce the overall number of cases without
a majority opinion. Under the current regime, a case without a majority

92.
Fontana & Huq, supwr note 54, at 59-60. They go on to suggest that the Court's current
social network "of commentators, think tanks, scholars, and lawyers, largely located inside the
Beltway" in fact fosters institutional loyalty. Id. at 63-64. This overlooks the entire problem that I
identify in this Article: For many of the Justices, their social network is not that group, or at least
not all of it-their social network is their fan base. Daryl Levinson makes a similar mistake when
he suggests that judges are unlikely to engage in "empire-building" because whatever a judge
does it "will win [her] prestige among some segments of the bar, legal academy, and public, but
cost her prestige among others." Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional
Law, i 18 HARV. L. REv. 915, 963 (2005). For today's celebrity-seeking Justices, only particular
segments matter.
93.
See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial
Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 629-30, 63o n.65 (2000).
94.

Id.
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opinion is confusing to law students (and lower courts!95) but otherwise it
looks pretty much like the ordinary output of the Court. A one-sentence per
curiam stating only the result and that the Court could not reach agreement,
however, is an obvious outlier; too many of them might be embarrassing to
the Court and the Justices. And even if we ended up with the same number of
no-majority opinions as we have now, it might be easier on lower courts:
Rather than having to divine the meaning of a fractured decision, they would
act as they always do in the absence of a Supreme Court ruling, making and
following circuit precedent until and unless the Supreme Court issues a
ruling.
Finally, we might expect more compromise and collaboration among the

Justices. When a deliberative body must produce a unified written product,
each member has an incentive to persuade rather than command the other
members.9 6 As Richard Re has pointed out in suggesting that a case without a
majority opinion should not be considered precedential for any purpose,
requiring a majority ruling "offers an attractive way to encourage the Justices
to form beneficial precedents through compromise."97 Log-rolling (in the
relatively narrow sense of going along even if one is not completely satisfied
with the opinion, expecting the favor to be returned), careful editing of
opinions, and even jointly-authored opinions are more likely if no Justice has
the option of going it alone. Anonymity might also "facilitate internal
deliberative practices by making members amenable to compromise and
mutual persuasion."8
2.

Single Opinions and Judicial Minimalism

On a more abstract level, my proposal addresses-and eases-the tension
between minimalist opinions and opinions that provide guidance to lower
courts and other law-constrained officials (and thus increase certainty in the

95.
The Court currently directs lower courts to rely on the "narrowest" opinion if there is
no majority opinion. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (i977) (quoting Greggv. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). The Marks rule is easy to state but devilishly difficult to apply.
See generally Williams, supra note 4 (describing the current chaos surrounding plurality opinions);
Re, supra note 58 (criticizing Marks). Examples abound. In considering one recent no-majority
case on the Erie doctrine, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associales, P.A. v. Alls/ale Insurance Co., 559 U.S.
393 (2010), some lower courts follow the plurality opinion. See, e.g., Fed. Treasury Enter.
Sojuzplodoimport v. SPI Spirits Ltd., 726 F. 3 d 62, 83 (2d Cir. 2013). Others follow a concurring
opinion by a single Justice. See, e.g., James River Ins. Co. v. Rapid Funding, LLC, 658 F.3 d 1207,
1217 (i oth Cir. 201 1). One court has concluded that none of the opinions is controlling. Abbas
v. Foreign Poly Grp., LLC, 783 F. 3 d 1328, 1336-37 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Re, supranote 58,
at 1944-45 (describing lower court treatment ofl eeman v. United S/aes, 564 U.S. 522 (2011), in
which "the Court's least popular view became law" of most circuits under the Marks rule).
96.
I consider later, infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text, whether my approach could
backfire on a polarized Court, with the majority simply running roughshod over the minority in
the absence of dissenting opinions calling the majority to account.
97.
Re, supra note 58, at 1972.
98.
Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 40, at 1695.
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law).99 Minimalist opinions are narrow rather than broad, deciding only the
issue before the Court. They are also shallow rather than deep, reflecting
"incompletely theorized agreements" among Justices who cannot reach
consensus on the deeper philosophical and jurisprudential questions lurking
under the surface of the particular dispute.'°' But minimalist opinions
provide less guidance to lower courts, a major function of Supreme Court
opinions.", Indeed, one scholar lists the obligation of "establishing law that
gives reasonably clear guidance for the future" as one of only seven
uncontroversial rules of recognition that define legitimate Supreme Court
practice.2
It is superficially easy to conclude that prohibiting concurrences (and, to
a lesser extent, dissents) might yield more minimalist opinions for the Court,
as Justices seek to write opinions that persuade a majority of the Court to sign
on to the opinion and not just to endorse the result. This might then provide
less guidance, and less certainty. As Fred Schauer puts it, "[t]o adopt the
course of minimalism ...
is to adopt the course of nonguidance."" Cass
Sunstein, who first championed minimalism, has more recently backed away
from it, in part because minimalism reduces certainty."4 He therefore finds
the increase in multiple opinions largely untroubling because it provides
more benefits than costs.°5 He recognizes, however, "that for those who favor
minimalism, there is a plausible instrumental argument in favor of a norm of
consensus."",)6
But the link between prohibiting multiple opinions and generating
minimalist opinions is not as tight as it might seem. First, as Schauer has
pointed out, the current Supreme Court frequently fails to give guidance
despite the multiplicity of opinions." AJustice's currently credible threat to
withhold his or her endorsement of the majority opinion is likely to lead to
"muddied explanations and fragmented majorities," neither of which gives
much guidance to lower courts.-" And although the lack of guidance under

99.
For discussions of this tension, see, for example, Sunstein, supra note
Schauer, supra note 4, at 207-08.
100.

81,

at 812-14; and

See generally CAss R. SIJNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE

SUPREME COURT

(1999).

See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 4, at 206-10; Schauer, supra note 2, at 1469-71; Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the
"judicialPower," 8o B.U. L. REv. 967, 997 (2000); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the
Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 807-09 (1982).
101.

102

.

103.

FAIION,

supra note 9,

Schauer, supro

at 99-1

oo.

note 4, at 228.

.

.

104.
Sunstein, supra note 81, at 814. One also suspects that his list of the cases that would
have been decided more narrowly under a minimalist approach-all of which are liberal-might
have influenced his change of heart.
105.
Id.at81 5 ,816.
1o6. Id. at 81 4
107.
Schauer, supra note 4, at 231
1o8.
Nancy Staudt, Barry Friedman & Lee Epstein, On the Role of Ideological Homogeneity in
Generating Consequential Constitutional Decisions, i o U. PA. J. CONST. L. 361, 371 (2008).
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the current regime does not rule out the possibility that single opinions would
give even less guidance, two aspects of my proposal reduce the tendency
toward minimalism. The fact that no one will know how many justices' views
are represented by the majority opinion means that the Court can still issue
wide and deep opinions as long as five Justices agree. By banning both
multiple opinions and vote counts, my proposal also removes a current
disincentive cutting against maximalist opinions: The broader the opinion,
the more likely there are to be dissents and concurrences and the broader the
target for those dissenting and concurring Justices. Thus the proposal pulls in
both directions. Additionally, my insistence on anonymity and the
concomitant inability to play to one's base might allow (or force) Justices to
focus more on providing guidance to the lower courts and less on speaking to
"[t] hose who have the ability to make or breakjudicial reputations," including
law professors and journalists."109
In short, anonymity, silence about the Justices' votes, and a ban on
multiple opinions work together to provide incentives for the Justices to reach
consensus on an opinion that is just maximalist enough to provide guidance.
And if the proposal works as expected, the Justices should eventually view
themselves as intended-more as part of an institution and less as individual
actors. As this view of their role sharpens and hardens, they will seek to protect
the Court as an institution. One danger to the institution is the possibility that
lower courts will exploit ambiguity or gaps in Supreme Court opinions to
undermine the Court's holdings in various ways. 11 The Justices will therefore
have an incentive to reach broader or deeper agreement that can be reflected
in the per curiam opinion: Maximalist and more thoroughly reasoned
opinions provide at least a partial safeguard against lower-court perfidy."'
Thus even if my proposal produces overly minimalist opinions to start, the
institutional changes that it sets in motion should eventually lead to an
optimal balance between minimalist and maximalist opinions.
The choice between minimalism and guidance is closely related to
another dichotomy that my proposal bridges. A number of scholars have
compared the American judicial practices with those of civil-law countries,
especially France.12 In the latter, most courts produce a single opinion that
i og. Schauer, supra note 4, at 234; see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Paulson K. Varghese, Scalia
in the Casebooks, 84 U. CHI. L. REv. 2231, 2232-33 (2017) (measuring Justices' influence by how
often their opinions appear in casebooks).
I 10.
See CORLEY, supra note 85, at 73, and sources cited therein; see also Barry Friedman, The
Wages of Stealh Overruling (wi/h PaticularAllen/ion to Miranda v. Arizona), gg GEO L.J. 1, 48-49
(2010) ('By sending confusing messages, the Justices run the risk of losing control over the
direction of the law altogether.").
111.
Cf Ashley S. Deeks, Secret Reason-Giving, 129 YALE L.J. 612, 628 (2020) ("Understanding
the reasons behind a decision helps government officials execute it in a manner consistent with
the decision-maker's goals.").
112.
See generally MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E LASSER, JiTDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF JUI)ICIAL TRANSPARENCY ANI) LEvGI'IMACY (2004) (comparing U.S. law with the Court
of Cassation in France); Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A
ComparativeLaw Approach, 72 WASI. & LEE L. REV. 483 (2015) (examining judges' reasons in the
United States and Europe). I give a simplified and generalized description of the French judicial
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describes the facts, restates the statutory law, and reaches a one-sentence
conclusion; there is little or no reasoning. The opinion need not contain
much guidance, because it has no precedential effect-neither the issuing
court nor lower courts are bound by the decision beyond the narrow effect on
the parties themselves."- As one scholar has suggested, the difference
between the French and American regimes lies in how much transparency is
expected of courts (which, in France, is very little)."4 And the reason for the
difference, he suggests, is that in the United States, judicial legitimacy is
grounded in the judges' "(public) argumentation," while in France it is
grounded "in the expertise and quality of its judicial institutions."" 15 My
proposal incorporates the best of both worlds by allowing-indeed
expecting-careful reasoning in support of the result but still requiring the
institution of the Court to speak with one voice. Mandating a single opinion
makes the reasons for the result transparent even if the process by which that
decision is reached is somewhat less transparent." 6 My proposal thus
maintains enough transparency to allow the public to judge the legitimacy of
judicial decisions while lessening the current deleterious impact of multiple
opinions.
3.

Partial Measures Won't Work

Notice that all parts of my proposed law are necessary to accomplish these
goals. Adopting only anonymity without limiting separate opinions is likely to
fail for several reasons."1 First, public perception of the Court as polarized
and political will remain unchanged. Even without names attached, different
opinions coming from the same case will contain reasoning that marks them
as the "conservative" or "liberal" argument. More important, anonymity alone
does nothing to reduce the Justices' ability or incentive to play to their bases.
It would be all too easy for a Justice to hide hints to his or her identity within
the opinion, and all too tempting for the media and law professors to play a

regime, which contains both some exceptions to the lack of binding precedent and a separate
system of academic commentary on decisions ("notes d'arrts") that plays a role similar to that of
American judicial opinions. See EVA STEINER, FRENCH LEGAL METHOD 82-9i, 179-85 (2002).
This rejection of both binding precedent and stare decisis applies to the decisions of all
113.
lower courts and two of the highest courts, the Court of Cassation and the Conseil d'Etat, but not
to the decisions of the Conseil Constitutionnel. STEINER, supra note I 12, at 79-80.
114.

LASSER, supra note r 12, at 3oo.

Id. at vii. Other scholars have made similar points, suggesting that individual reputation
matters more in "recognition"judiciaries like the United States (which tend to be common law)
than in "career" judiciaries like France and Japan (which tend to be civil law). See GAROUPA
GINSBURG, supranote 27, at 18-19, 29-30, 44-48.
1 16.
I discuss in Section IIIB. questions about whether separate opinions, reflecting a more
transparent deliberative process, are necessary to legitimize the Court's decisions.
I 17. A handful of commentators have suggested that opinions should be issued
anonymously, including concurring and dissenting opinions. Lerner & Lund, supra note 30, at
1 260; Peter Bozzo, Note, The Jurisprudenceof "As Though": Democratic Dialogue and the Signed Supreme
Court Opinion, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 269, 300 (2014) (not actually endorsing unsigned
opinions but urgingJustices to write "as ifthey were issuing unsigned opinions"); James Markham,
Note, Against Individually Signed Opinions, 56 DUKE L.J. 923, 927 (2006).
&

115.

2020]

OUR KARDASHIAN COURT

205

game of "guess who."" 8 Indeed, anonymity might increase the incentive to
write politicized opinions: Lacking a straightforward method of identifying
themselves for reputational purposes, the Justices would have to work harder
to make themselves identifiable to their target audiences. Finally, permitting
concurrences and dissents means that Justices still have no incentive to join
the majority opinion, and thus there would be no reduction in the number of
cases lacking a majority opinion at all.
Similarly, merely disclosing vote counts (even in the absence of
additional opinions) would dilute the power of the institution, lead to
negative publicity, and generate more guessing games. John Marshall knew
this, and his early opinions for the Court usually gave no clue as to how many
Justices joined."9 And prohibiting multiple opinions (with or without
disclosing the vote count) but identifying the author of the opinion for the
Court still allows that author to play to his or her base. Stifling the other
Justices might diminish the problem somewhat, but it might also cause
internal strife as Justices jockey to be the author of the Court's opinion in
high-profile cases. 20 If the Court's opinion is unattributed, authorship is less
important.
Skeptics might argue-citing Marshall as an example-that even if
something like my proposal would be good for the Court, we do not need
Congress to legislate it. The Court once valued consensus (and obscurity rather
than notoriety), and it could do so again. Ideological diversity on the Court is
not a barrier; the earlier norm of consensus manifested itself in public
unanimity despite private disagreement, as potentially dissenting Justices
engaged in silent acquiescence.' Even as late as the early twentieth century,
Chief Justice Taft endorsed the norm of silent acquiescence: "I don't approve
of dissentings generally, for I think in many cases where I differ from the
majority, it is more important to stand by the Court and give its judgment
weight than merely to record my individual dissent . . ."2

i 18.
And the game would be made easier by developments in artificial intelligence ("AI"). In
France, where (as noted earlier) the court produces a single signed opinion, researchers began
using Al to try to identify judges through their linguistic patterns. They were successful enough
that France criminalized the activity. See France Bans Judge Analytics, 5 Years in Prison for Rule
Breakers, ARitFICIAL LAW. (June 4, 20 I 9), https://wcww.artificiallawyer.com/201 g/06/04/
france-bans-judge-analytics-5-years-in-prison-for-rule-breakers [https://perma.cc/gPKC-XS29].
i19.
See 3-4 G. EDwARD Wi itrE, TiIE MARS1HAIL1 COURT AND CUITURAI CIIANGE, 1815

-35, at 187-88 (1988).
120.
The current nonn (although not fornally required) is to equalize the number of
majority opinions assigned to each Justice.
121.
See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 45 An. J. POI.. SCi- 362, 364 (2001); Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as
InstitutionalPractice:Dissent, LegalScholarship,and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REv.
1267, 1331-38, 1340-44 (2001); see also Sunstein, supra note 81, at 786-87 (discussing Chief
Justice Marshall's desire of public unanimity and dislike of dissents).
122.
David M. O'Brien, InstitutionalNorms and Supremne Court Opinions: On Reconsideringthe Rise
oflndividnalOpinions, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACI tES
91, 93 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
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But changing the Court from within has been tried, and it has failed.
After the sharp rise in separate opinions during the Chief Justiceship of
Harlan Fiske Stone,2J President Truman chose Fred Vinson to replace Stone
in large part to try to return to the prior norm of consensus. 2 4 It failed, and
the Vinson Court "was perhaps the most severely fractured Court in
history,"125 earning the sobriquet "nine scorpions in a bottle."26 Six decades
later, ChiefJustice John Roberts espoused the same goal of re-establishing a
norm of consensus. In an interview at the end of his first year as Chief, Roberts

said
he would make it his priority, as Marshall did, to discourage his
colleagues from issuing separate opinions. "I think that everyjustice
should be worried about the Court acting as a Court and
functioning as a Court, and they should all be worried, when they're
writing separately, about the effect on the Court as an institution."17
I leave as an exercise for the reader whether he has succeeded in the decade
and a half since that interview. The problem is that the norm of separate
opinion-writing, once rare, has become entrenched.22 Only Congress can
successfully limit the Court to a single unattributed opinion.
Finally, my proposal has one last advantage over at least some of the other
solutions. Because it is a statutory change rather than a constitutional
amendment, it can be undone relatively easily. We might view it as an
experiment that can be unplugged if it goes bad.
The question remains whether Congress may prohibit separate or signed
opinions, and whether it would, on balance, be a good idea. In Part IV, I turn
to objections to my proposal, including both potential constitutional
challenges and more pragmatic objections.

I 23. It is almost uniformly agreed that the Stone Court-and in particular the 1941 Term
-marked the sudden transformation from a Court with few concurrences or dissents to a (still
extant) Court where individual opinions are the norm. See, e.g., PAMELA C. CORLEY, AMY
SIIIGVRWAI:F & ARTIMUS WARD, TI IF PUZZIE OF UNANIMIY: CONSENSUS ON TIIIE UNITID STATLS
SUPREME COURT 14-22 (2013); EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 7, at 24; Thomas G. Walker, Lee
Epstein & William J. Dixon, On the Mysterious Demise of ConsensualNorms in the United Stales Supreme
Cout, 50 J. PoI Fcs 361, 361-63 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 81, at 773-83. A few studies have
suggested that the trend began earlier, during the Chief Justiceship of Charles Evans Hughes,
although the rate increased dramatically under Stone. See Bennett et al., supra note 85, at 863
and sources cited therein; O'Brien, supra note 122, at 100-01.
124.
Walker et al., supra note 123, at 385.
125.
KIIUGER, supra note 79, at 584; see 12 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, TIlE BIRTH OF THE MODERN
CONSITI lON: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, at 424-25 (2006); MICHAL R.
BELKNAP, THE VINSON COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGAGY 40 (2004); Karl M. ZoBell, Division

of Opinion in the Supeme Coui:A Jlistwy of JudicialDisintegration,44 CORNEILI L.Q. 186, 204 (1959)126.

ROBERT

J.

STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1986).

Rosen, supra note 82.
128.
See CORLEY ET AL., supra note 123, at 1i; Sunstein, supra note 81, at 772 (stressing "pathdependence"); see also Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 40, at 1701 (suggesting that it would be
"hopeless" to expect the Court to exercise self-restraint).
127.
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IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS

A.

CoNST'/TUTIIONA L OlfyECTIONS

I can imagine three possible constitutional objections to my proposal.
First, unsigned opinions-or single opinions for the Court-might be
thought to violate the constitutional rights of litigants. That cannot be the
case, however, as the Court frequently issues per curiam opinions (both with
and without reasoned explanations) on the merits. Moreover, the Court itself
never provides an explanation or discloses the votes for denials of certiorari,
although individual Justices occasionally write separately. Similarly, opinions
of the Court have issued since John Marshall's time as ChiefJustice. Litigants
do not even have a right to a reasoned opinion; 12 they cannot possibly have
a right to an attributed opinion or to dissents and concurrences.
The second possible objection is that prohibiting dissents and
concurrences violates the First Amendment rights ofJustices who wish to write
such opinions. Justices Douglas and Brennan hinted as much.'-, But at least
as the law stands, this challenge is only slightly more difficult to dispense with.
As government employees, the Justices have limited First Amendment rights.
Established precedent confirms the constitutional validity of my proposal.
The Court in Garcetti v. Caballos3' drew a distinction between speaking as a
citizen and speaking as a government employee; only the former is protected
by the First Amendment.132 Unless the employee speaks as a citizen on matters
of public concern, "the employee has no First Amendment cause of action
based on his or her employer's reaction to the speech."ui, The Court thus held
"that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties" their speech can be punished or restricted.134 When Justices publish
opinions, they are acting pursuant to their official duties, which therefore
leaves Congress free to specify what they may or may not say (within the
bounds of separation of powers principles, to which I turn next). 15

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)
1 29.
("[S]ince this Court reviews judgments, not opinions, we must determine whether the Court of
Appeals' legal error resulted in an erroneous judgment .... "). Reasoned opinions serve other
purposes, including "providing higher courts with a mechanism to facilitate their review of lower
courts' decisions." Cohen, supra note 1 12, at 532. As noted earlier, reasoned opinions also
provide guidance to lower courts and other government actors. See supra text accompanying notes
101-02. Reason-giving by unelectedjudges also substitutes for democratic accountability. See infra
text accompanying note 18o. On reason-giving generally, see Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons,
47 STAN. L. REv. 633 (1995)130.
See William O. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguardof Democracy, 32 J. AM. JUJDICAT IRE SOC'Y
104, 105 (1948) ("Disagreement among judges is as true to the character of democracy as
freedom of speech itself."); William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427,
435 (1986) (describing dissents as contributions to "the marketplace of competing ideas").
131.
Garcetti v. Caballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
132.
Id. at 421-22.
133.

134.

Id. at 418.
Id.at 4 2i.

Alternatively, limiting the Justices' ability to speak through separate opinions can be
135.
justified under the doctrine of Pickeringv. Board of Education.That case and its progeny established
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The most plausible constitutional objections are that Congress
mandating per curiam majority opinions and prohibiting concurrences or
dissents violates separation of powers principles. Constitutional objections
could come in two forms: either it is beyond Congress' enumerated powers,
or it invades the province of the judiciary. The Necessary and Proper Clause
is undoubtedly sufficient to respond to the first objection. As many others
have noted, that clause gives Congress the authority to adopt laws that
implement not only its own powers, but the powers of the other two
branches.3 As Gary Lawson puts it, it is "beyond cavil" that the Necessary and
Proper Clause provides authority "for congressional legislation with respect
to the operations of the judicial department.",7 And that authority is
extremely broad: It is within "the sole power of Congress to determine, and
to make provision for, incidental (but not indispensable) powers that in its
view may promote greater efficiency in the executive or judicial departments."3 80
The second objection boils down to the question whether decisions about
how to attribute opinions-and which opinions to permit-are an inherent
aspect of the "judicial power" and thus vested by Article III in the judiciary
alone. In other words, we must determine whether Article III limits
congressional power when it comes to opinion-writing practices. As far as I
can ascertain, this question has never been seriously addressed.39 But one

that when a public employee speaks on matters of public concern, the government can
nonetheless restrict the speech if the government's interest as an employer outweighs the rights
of the employee. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The arguments in this
Article suggest that the government's interest is high, and the fact that for more than 150 years
the Justices largely restrained themselves from writing separately suggests that the speech
interests are low. In addition, the infringement on speech is only partial: Justices are free to speak
anywhere, and in any manner, they choose except through officially published opinions. Finally,
consider Rust v. Sullivan: "Individuals who are voluntarily employed for a Title X project must
perform their duties in accordance with the regulation's restrictions on abortion counseling and
referral." Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (99i). The same could be said of individuals who
are voluntarily employed in the judicial branch.
136.
See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The President'sStatutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 1o6 COwUM.
L. Rvv. 263, 300-02 (2006); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section r: hrom Nondelegation
IoExclusivelDelegation, 104 COLM. L. REV. 2097, 2130 (2004 );John Harrison, The Powerof Congress
Over the Rules of Precedent, 5o DUKE L.J. 503, 5312-35 (2000). See generally Gary Lawson, Controlling
Precedent: CongressionalRegulation of judicial Decision-Making, i8 CONSI. COMMENT. 191 (2001)
(discussing the ways in which "Congress ... regulates the manner in which federal courts exercise
their jurisdiction").
Lawson, supra note 136, at 198.
138.
William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Delermining Incidental Powers of the President
and of the FederalCourts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of "The Sweeping Clause, "36 OHIO ST. L.J.
788, 807 (1975).
139. Three pieces of scholarship have previously suggested that anonymous Supreme Court's
opinions might be beneficial. Two relied on voluntary action by the Court and thus raised no
constitutional issues. See generally Bozzo, supra note 117 (suggesting the Court shift to unsigned
opinions); Markham, sunpranote 117 (same). The third disposes of the question in one sentence
in a footnote: "Given the many well-accepted ways in which Congress constrains judicial power,
such as dictating rules ofjudicial procedure and evidence, we think it would be very difficult to
construct a persuasive argument that any of our proposals are unconstitutional." Lerner & Lund,
supra note 30, at 1282 n.132. I am not so sanguine, and at least think the question deserves
137.
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scholar has tentatively concluded that because "Congress lacks power to
control the content or manner of judicial opinion-writing," it could not
prohibit the publication of concurrences or dissents.141 It is thus worth
considering the question in some depth.
The contours of the judicial power are notoriously uncertain. The
Supreme Court has identified three types of limitations onjudicial power that
are forbidden by Article III. First, Congress may not dictate what result a court
should reach in a particular case., Second, "Congress cannot vest review of
the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch."14Finally, Article III "gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule
on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts," and
thus Congress cannot retroactively compel federal courts to reopen final
judgments. 43 But what Congress can do outside of these forbidden actions is
unclear, to say the least.
The uncertainty regarding congressional authority has given rise to
voluminous scholarly debates. Most familiar is the extensive discussion of the
extent to which Congress can strip jurisdiction from the federal courts in
general or the Supreme Court in particular. 44 That discussion is not directly

attention. In addition, no one has suggested prohibiting separate opinions, and thus no one has
addressed the constitutionality of that part of my proposal.
140.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedenhial 17//ec ofRoe and Casey?, 1og YALtE L.J. 1535, 1591 n.154 (2000).
141.
See United States v. Klein, 8o U.S. (i 3 Wall.) i 28, 146-48 (187 ). It is widely accepted
that Klein stands for at least the proposition that Congress cannot control the Court's
constitutional rulings. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, The IrrepressibleMyth ofKlein, 79 U. CIN. L.
REV 53, 56 (2o1o); James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Sote Effectuall'ower": The Quantily and
Qualily ofDecisionmaking Required ofArticle IHCours, 98 ComuM. L. REV. 696, 815-23 (1998). How
much further Klein extends is the subject of some debate. Gary Lawson notes that "[e]veryone"
agrees "that Congress cannot enact a statute instructing a federal court to decide a specific case
in a specific way." Lawson, supra note 136, at 201. Apparently, "everyone" does not include a
majority of current Justices. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. I3Io, 1325-26 (2o16);
Patchak v. Zinke, I38 S. Ct. 897, 9o8-o9 (2o18).
Plautv. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 5 1 4 tU.S. 211, 218 (1995) (citingHayburn's Case, 2 U.S.
142.
(2 DalI.) 4o9 (1792)).

Id. at 218-19.
A representative sampling of the literature reads like a Who's Who of federal courts
144.
scholars. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 65; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping
Reronsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043 (2010); William A. Fletcher, CongressionalPower Over the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: The Meaning of the Word "All" in Article 1ff, 59 DUKE L.J. 929 ( 2010);
James E. Pfander, FederalSupremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of JurisdictionStrippingLegislation, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 191 (20o7); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The
Unitary Executive, Jwisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice
Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. I 002 (2007); Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Strippingin a ime
of Terror, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1193 (20o7); Michael G. Collins, The1Federal Courts, he 1i)rsl Congrss,
and the Non-Settlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REv. 1515 (2005); Barry Friedman, A Diffrent Dialogue:
The Supreme Coil, Congress, and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. (i 990); Daniel J. Meltzer,
The History and Shrucure of Artic7 III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Robert N. Clinton, A
Mandatory View of Federal CourtJuisdiction:A Guided Questfor the OriginalUnderstandingofArticle I
132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court
Jurisdiction:An OpinionatedGuide lo le OngoingDebat,36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Paul M. Bator,
CongressionalPowerOver the Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts, 27 ViL. L. REv. i oo ( i 982); Lawrence
,
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relevant to my proposal. No one contends that fully defining the scope of its
own jurisdiction is inherent in a court's exercise of the judicial power and thus
beyond the reach of Congress; the text of the Constitution-to say nothing of
the history since its adoption-makes clear that Congress has a large role to
play in defining jurisdiction. In particular, while there is dispute about
whether Congress may deprive the courts of jurisdiction, there is universal
agreement that Congress can confer jurisdiction.45 The constitutionality of
jurisdiction-stripping thus depends more on historical, theoretical, and
semantic arguments about such things as the meaning of the Exceptions
Clause, the breadth of the allocation of "the" judicial power, and theories
about the role of the courts in policing the political branches. Those issues
are not easily translatable to questions about the contours of inherentjudicial
power in the context of regulating opinion-writing. Similarly, an ongoing
debate about the constitutionality of congressional control over recusal
decisions by Supreme Court Justices raises narrow questions that shed little
light on the scope of Congress' power generally.i4
Some scholars, however, have addressed broader questions of
congressional power over the judiciary. Several have suggested that Congress
can regulate the courts' use of principles of stare decisis in constitutional
cases,147 and at least one has contended the Congress could dictate rules of
statutory interpretation.'4 8 These proposals would allow Congress to control
judicial methodology-the tools that courts use when deciding cases. Telling
the Court what methodology it may or must use comes perilously close to
telling it how cases should come out, surely an essential component ofjudicial
power.49 As Gary Lawson puts it, "Congress cannot tell courts how to reason

foreword: Cons/itutional Limi/alions on Congress' Authorily to Reguiate thefurisdition of /he
Federal Cours, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); Martin H. Redish, Constilulional Limi/alions on
Congressional Power to Control Federal fJrisdiction:A Reaction to Professor Sager; 77 Nw. U. L. KEv. i4
(1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authorily to Restrict Lower Federal Conrt fuhisdiction, 83
YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress lo Limit the Jurisdiction ofFederal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (i953).
145.
This is not to say that the Constitution places no limits to Congress' power to confer
jurisdiction on the federal courts. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, i 8o (i803).
146. Compare Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 589, 656
-61 (1987) (arguing that Congress can regulate Supreme Court recusals), and Suzanne Levy,
Comment, Your Ionor, Please Explain: Why Congress Can, and Should, Require Justices to Publish
Reasons for Theireusal, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1187-93 (2014) (same), wi/iT LouisJ. Virelli
III, The (Un)Cons/itutionalily of Supreme Cour Recusal S/andards, 2011 WIs. L. REV. 1181, 1184-85
(arguing that Congress cannot regulate Supreme Court recusals).
See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 140, at 1540; Harrison, supra note 1 36, at 504. But see
147.
Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis and the Cons/itution: Four Ques/ions and Answers, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1 173, 1 175-76 (2008); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on
ConstilulionalMetodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 571-72 (2001); Lawson, supra note 136, at 194;
el James Durling, May Congress Abrogate S/are Derisis by Slabule?, 127 YALE L.J.F. 27, 31 (2017)
(suggesting that Congress can regulate the use of stare decisis in statutory cases even if not in
constitutional cases).
148.
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of S/a/utory In/erpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2085, 2085 (2002).
149.
For an argument that methodological rules are a type of law, implying that Congress
cannot dictate methodology in contexts in which it cannot dictate substantive outcomes (in other
Gene Sager,
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any more than it can tell courts how to decide."150 Thomas Healy illustrates
the problem with congressional limitations on judicial methodology by
drawing an analogy to a hypothetical statute "prohibiting the courts from
relying upon original understanding in interpreting the Constitution."'s' My
proposal, which restricts only the Court's communication methods and not
how it decides or reasons, is even more likely to be constitutional than these
proposals.
But these proposals are controversial, to say the least. A more robust
defense of my proposal requires a broader discussion of the scope of the
judicial power and its essential attributes that are protected from
congressional interference. In a classic article on the topic, Leo Levin and
Anthony Amsterdam suggested "thatjudges may not be inhibited from ... the
effective resolution ofjusticiable controversies."152 Michael Paulsen describes
"the essence of Article III power" as "decisional autonomy on the merits of
questions of law presented in cases properly within the courts' jurisdiction."I
David Engdahl defines judicial power as "what a tribunal may do regarding
matters within its jurisdiction."'34 Nicholas Rosenkranz talks about the
"necessary incidents of the judicial power."Th Others limn the scope of the
judicial power by emphasizing what is not included within it. John Harrison
excludes "legislation that is based on systemic considerations that are divorced
from particular doctrinal results."56 Stephen Burbank notes that prospective
procedural rulemaking is not an inherent judicial power, distinguishing it
from "the power ... to make law when deciding cases"157 and the "powers that
are necessary for [courts] ... to function as courts exercising judicial power

words, in constitutional cases), see Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutoiy /nterpretation: Methodology
as "Law" and Ihe Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1915-17 (2011). Scholars who argue in favor
of congressional power over methodology have several responses. One is that principles of stare
decisis are either common-law rules or rules based on policy, and thus can be overridden by
statute. Paulsen, supra note 140, at 1543-51; Harrison, supra note 136, at 528-29. Rosenkranz
makes the same argument regarding tools of statutory interpretation. Rosenkranz, supra note
148, at 2107-08. A more oblique response is that regulating stare decisis is simply legislating what
factors the Court may consider in making its decision, and that such relatively uncontroversial
congressional enactments as the Rules of Decision Act and the Rules of Evidence similarly limit
what courts can consider in deciding cases. Paulsen, supra note 140, at 1582-87. Both responses
are undermined if stare decisis itself (or methods of statutory interpretation) has constitutional
stature, as Richard Fallon suggests. See Fallon, supra note 147, at 577-78; see also Henry Paul
Monaghan, S/are Derisis and Constilulional Adjudiralion, 88 COJUM. L. REV. 723, 754 (1988)
("[T] he principle of stare decisis inheres in the judicial power' of [A] rticle III.").
150.
Lawson, supra note 136, at 214.
151.
Healy, supra note 147, at i 202.
152.
A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Conlrol Over fudicialRule-Making: A
Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30 (1958).
Paulsen, supra note 140, at 1596.
153.
154.
David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999
BYU L. REv. 75, 83Rosenkranz, suira note 148, at 2102.
155.
156.
Harrison, supra note 136, at 505.
Stephen B. Burbank, rocedure, Politics and 'ower: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
157.
REV. 1677, 1685 (2004).
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under Article III."5 Martin Redish identifies five types of judicial
independence from Congress, four of which are essential attributes ofjudicial
power. For the purposes of this Article, the most important inclusions are
those having to do with interpreting and applying the law in individual cases
with finality, and the only exclusion is what he calls "lawmaking"
independence: "the ability ...
to create . . . controlling subconstitutional
substantive legal principles . . . in the course of [adjudicating individual
cases]."Is9
What all these generalities have in common is that they are part of the
process ofjudicial decision-making. And more specific examples confirm that
it is the process of effectual decision-making that must be protected from
congressional interference. Scholars attempting to give content to the
inherent and exclusive powers of the judiciary have focused not only on the
reasoning and the outcome of a case, but on the "manner" of decisionmaking,i6o the giving of reasons for the decision,' and the ability of courts
to justify their decisions as legitimate.162 This view that Article III prohibits
only congressional interference with the decision-making process is also
consistent with the Court's limited existing jurisprudence on the issue:
Congress cannot tell the courts how to decide cases, nor can it deprive them
of the power to make final judgments by either subjecting those judgments to
t
non-judicial review or by requiring courts to reopen them.'6
My proposal is outside the decision-making function. Regulating the
manner by which the Court can communicate its decision does not intrude on

158.
159.

Id. at 1688.
MARTIN H. RDIsil, JUDIcIAL INDIEPVNDIENC

53

AND Ti1E AMERICAN CONSI'TIION: A

see also id. at 52-76 (describing the relevant ideas). Redish's
primary example of subconstitutional substantive legal principles governing the courts are rules
of procedure. See id. at 73-75. A similar description of the necessity of decisional independence
and finality (along with some additional matters) is found in Liebman & Ryan, supra note 141, at 704.
DEMOCRATIC PARADOx

(017);

Liebman & Ryan, supra note 141, at 754.
Bhagwat, supa note lol, at 973. Bhagwat suggests that giving reasons is what
distinguishes the judicial power from legislative power, and thus that it is part of the essence of
judging. Stephen Burbank, on the other hand, has suggested that a statute requiringa written
opinion (that is, requiring the giving of reasons) "would present an interesting test" of the limits
of Congress' power over the courts. Burbank, supra note 157, at 1688 n.37. Two nineteenth
century courts actually invalidated state laws requiring written opinions in every case, on the
ground that the court's "constitutional duty is discharged by the rendition of decisions." Houston
v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24,125 (1859); accord Vaughan v. Harp, 49 Ark. I60, 4 S.W. 751, 753 (1887).
Houston was overruled by state constitutional amendment in 1879. See People v. Kelly, 146 P. 3 d
547, 550-54 (Cal. 2006). Vaughan, on the other hand, was cited positively as late as 1973- See
Upton v. State, 501 S.W.ad 454, 456 (Ark. 1973). In 1821, the Louisiana legislature required
separateopinions by each supreme court judge in each case;judges complied by writing "I concur
in the opinion for the reasons adduced." See Joe W. Sanders, The Role of Dissenting Opinions in
Louisiana, 13 LA. L. REv. 673, 677-78 (1963). "The law was . . repealed the following year." See
id. at 678. Ironically, Louisiana later "prohibiledthe publication of dissenting opinions" in its 1898
Constitution. Although the official case reporter complied, the Southern Reporter-West's
private publication-continued to publish dissents. (The ban was eliminated in 1921.) See id. at
678 (emphasis added).
i614. Healy, supra note 147, at 1199.
16o.

161.

163.

See snura notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
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its ability to make the decision however, and by whatever methodology or
reasoning, it chooses. Thus, even if regulation of judicial methodology is off
limits for Congress, my proposal is easily distinguishable on the ground that
it affects only matters that arise after the Court has already made (and
justified) its decision. It may have indirect effects on howJustices decide (for
example, as I argued earlier, it might foster compromise and cooperation
among the Justices) but it does not directly regulate the decision-making
process. My proposal is also distinguishable on pragmatic grounds. As Richard
Fallon notes, prohibiting the Court from relying on stare decisis "would
threaten chaos,",64 while prohibiting concurrences and dissents would reduce
the chaos currently generated by a multiplicity of conflicting opinions.
A skeptic might respond that by limiting the number and range of
opinions that can be produced, my proposal interferes with the ability of the
Court to legitimate and justify its decisions, thus diminishing its judicial
power.165 But there is a crucial distinction between the power of the Court as
an institution and the power of individualJustices. My proposal may diminish
the ability of individualJustices to explain and legitimate their viewpoints, but
it does not intrude on the power of the institution as a whole.,b And it is the
institution of the Court, not the individual Justices, that is entrusted with
judicial power.
Alternatively, we might define the essence of judicial power-especially
the decision-making process-as cabined in time. Congress can determine
what goes into the decision-making process by specifying which cases the
Court may or must hear.17 It can also regulate what comes out of the decisionmaking process in various ways, including by specifying what types of
judgments-such as affirmance, modification, vacation, and so on-the
Supreme Court may issuet68 and by requiring the court reporter to "prepare
the decisions of the Court for publication."i6 ) In between, Congress has no
authority. Thus, as a matter of separation of powers Congress could not
prohibit the Justices from writing concurrences or dissents and circulating
them internally, but it can prohibit the court reporter from publishing them
in the official volumes.'w Similarly, prohibiting the publication of authorial

164.

Fallon, supranote 147, at 593-94
See Healy, supra note 147, at i 199 (" [T] he power to decide cases would not mean much
165.
if courts could not explain why those decisions were legitimate and entitled to respect.");
Engdahl, supra note 154, at 102-04 (Necessary and Proper Clause only authorizes laws that "help
effectuate," not laws that "diminish, curtail, or interfere" with the powers of the other branches).
166. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text. Sometimes what appears to be a limit
actually enhances, rather than undermines, the power of the entity being limited. Tara Grove has
made an analogous argument with regard to the Exceptions Clause: Congress has used its power
to facilitate rather than diminish the Court's judicial role. Tara Leigh Grove, The L'xepions Clause
as a Snr, IuralSaekguard, 113 CoIUM. L. REv. 929, 978 (2013).
167. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1260 (2018).
168.
Id. § 2106.
169. Id. § 673(c); see also id. § 676 (directing the printing and binding of decisions).
It would probably also violate the First Amendment for Congress to prohibit the Justices
170.
from publishing or otherwise disseminating their views-including commentary on decided cases
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attribution or vote counts could be accomplished by directing the court
reporter to remove any such information before publication. However, if both
of those things are constitutional, then it seems a silly formality to require that
Congress direct its instructions to the court reporter rather than to the Court
itself.
Finally, one part of the Erie doctrine (muddled as it is'7') might actually
be of assistance by analogy. Erie, of course, tells federal courts to apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law. The methods of determining
which is which are famously byzantine and unpredictable. The flip side of Erie
(sometimes called "reverse-Erie"), however, is much more manageable
because it is a straightforward balancing test: State courts deciding federal
questions must apply federal substantive law, but they may apply state
procedural law as long as doing so does not unduly interfere with the
implementation of a substantive federal right.172
That balancing test can be adapted to present purposes. Congressional
regulation of the Supreme Court would be permitted as long as it does not
unduly interfere with the Court's ability to make, explain, or justify its
substantive decisions. Indeed, the classic exposition of the appropriate locus
of procedural rulemaking power places it first in the courts, but notes that it
is imperative "that at some point there be available legislative authority to
override the court where its actions reflect a policy fundamentally opposed to
what the legislators might consider to be in the significant best interests of the
people."73 The authors go on to explain that "[t]he need for legislative review
in the cases here considered arises from the fact that these procedures are so
intimately related with substantive considerations that inherent in them is the
potential of frustrating substantive policies."u4 Although in the rulemaking
context it is the legislative authority to prescribe substantive policy that must
be shielded, the same test can be used to describe the boundaries of exclusive
judicial authority. Limiting the type of opinions and prohibiting attribution
to individual Justices does not run afoul of this test.
Finally, there is a procedural problem with arguing that adopting my
proposal violates the Constitution: Even if one is persuaded of a violation, it
is not clear that it could be litigated. First, who would have standing? In most
(perhaps all) instances in which a particular branch's action is challenged as
a violation of separation of powers, there is a person or entity who suffers the

in the form of "dissents" or "concurrences"-elsewhere. For reasons I discuss infra in Section
IV.B. 3 , I do not believe that allowing such dissemination significantly reduces the effectiveness of
my proposal.
171.

See Suzanna Sherry, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Why

the Cour

Can' Fix the Erie Dorlrine, 10

J.L., ECON. & POL'Y 173, 174-77 (2013); Suzanna Sherry, Normalizing Erie, 69 VAND. L. REv.
1161, 1163 (2016).

172. Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 3 8 U.S. 294, 296 (i949); Dice v. Akron, Canton &Youngstown
R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (19 5 2); Felderv. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (i 9 88);Johnson v. Fankell,

0 U.S. 911, 916, 919 (1997); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1, 20 (2006) ("Determining the applicable law in state court involves the reverse-Erie doctrine.").
Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 152, at 16.
173.
174.
Id. at i8.
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consequences.'75 As noted earlier, however, no litigant has a right to separate
opinions, attributed opinions, or a vote count. The only persons who suffer
the concrete and tangible injury necessary for standing are Justices who want
their separate opinions (or their names) published in the United States
Reports. Assuming that one or more Justices might actually bring suit then
raises the second procedural question: Who could conclusively decide the
constitutional question? Not the Supreme Court, obviously. Presumably
district courts and courts of appeals (or state courts) could hear the case, but
what if those courts disagreed with one another?
In summary, however we define the scope of the judicial power, a federal
statute prohibiting signed or separate opinions does not invade it. But
concluding that a measure is constitutional does not demonstrate its wisdom
or effectiveness. The next Section therefore addresses nonconstitutional

objections to my proposal.
B.

Ouie OBECTIONS

Beyond constitutional barriers, opponents might make several objections
to my proposal. First, there is an argument that limiting separate opinions or
prohibiting attribution would result in more harm than good. Second,
skeptics might complain that as a practical matter it is unlikely to work as I
suggest. I address these objections in turn.
1.

Separate Opinions Serve Important Purposes

A number of scholars have defended concurrences and dissents as
necessary to legitimize judicial review by unelected judges in our democracy.
That argument comes in three similar but distinct flavors: democratic
legitimacy, public acceptance, and transparency. We might profitably divide
the arguments according to Richard Fallon's taxonomy of types of
legitimacy.76 Sociological legitimacy is concerned with whether the public
perceives the Court as legitimate and its authority as binding, and is therefore
focused primarily on public acceptance. Moral legitimacy, on the other hand,
raises normative questions about whether the Court should be able to bind
others and thus is, at least in the present context, interchangeable with
democratic legitimacy.77

Youngstown Sheet & Tube's property was seized. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
175.
Sawyer (S/eel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952). Men were held prisoner at Guantanamo. Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557 (2006);
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008). Jagdish Chadha's deportation suspension was
nullified. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983). Ted Olson was subpoenaed. Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 665 (1988). NewYork State lost federal funds. Clinton v. City of NewYork,
524 U.S. 417, 417 (1998). Noel Canning challenged an NLRB order against it. NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 513 (2014). And Menachem Zivotofsky's passport incorrectly listed his
place of birth. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 1 (2015).
176.
FAIION, supra note 9, at 22.
Fallon's third category, legal legitimacy, is more narrow, focusing on whether the
177.
Court's decisions are fairly within the parameters ofjudicial decisionrmaking. Few people seem to
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Some scholars who defend the need for separate opinions are most
worried about moral (or democratic) legitimacy. For example, Ferejohn and
Pasquino write that "[t]he [Court's] public expression of diverse legal views
about controversial issues has a direct value in a constitutional democracy."178
Another scholar argues that "[m]ultiple judicial opinions that grapple with
legal issues are the judicial analogue to a deliberative democratic . . . process,
which ... project an image of accountable judging and participation by
interested audiences."'79
I can make two responses specific to these arguments from moral or
democratic legitimacy. First, there is a strong argument that the democratic
legitimacy of Supreme Court rulings comes not from the diversity of opinions
but from the reasoned explanations given for the outcome. Indeed, scholars
have argued that reasoned opinions are essential because they function as a
substitute for democratic accountability,,
or, more broadly, because
adjudicative legitimacy rests on the giving of legal reasons.' 8 ' On this view, the
per curiam opinion would provide the same legitimacy. Second, and relatedly,
my proposal does not substantially limit the diversity of legal views, it just
relocates them from the pages of the United States Reports or the Supreme
Court's website to less official publications. Justices-and law professors
-would continue to express criticism of doctrines and cases in law reviews
and other fora. Admittedly, this is not as effective a means of communication,
but it serves the purpose. And stripped of the automatic publication (and
guaranteed audience), Justices might be forced to express themselves more
thoughtfully.
Other scholars are more concerned with sociological legitimacy. They
argue that dissents foster public acceptance of decisions among those who
disagree with the results, by demonstrating that their views were at least
considered.1"- If dissenting voices are completely excluded, they suggest, the
Court as an institution (and the opinions it does issue) will be diminished in
the eyes of the public.' 8 i Whether this is true is an empirical question beyond
the scope of this Article. Would losers feel better or worse about the outcome
if the Court spoke with one voice? On the one hand, they might feel
have many doubts about the legal legitimacy of most of the Court's output, although they may
question individual decisions here and there.
178.
Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 40, at 1673; see also id. at 1699 ("The open display of
competing viewpoints invites the attentive and affected public to discuss, argue, petition for new
laws, and otherwise work to shape these controversial policies.").

179. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOL UTION OF
INDIVIDUAL STYLES 126 (2007).

IIL JUDICIAL

OPINION: INS'IVTlU TIONAL AND

18o.
See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 1o1, at 973-74; Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 40, at
1697; Michael C. Dorf, Predictionand the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REv. 651, 686 ('995); Michael
C. Dorf, Dicta and Aticle III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2029 (1994); see also Schauer, supra note
1 2g, at 636-37 (identifying reason-giving as the "antithesis" of authority).
181.
See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 59, at 1012.
182.
See SALAMONE, supranote 7, at 61-62, 150; CORLEY ET AL., supra note 123, at 11.
183.
There is also implicit in these arguments a concern that Justices hiding behind the
anonymity of a single opinion will be less accountable to the public. I deal with that possibility in
the next Section, when I discuss the potential virtues of signed opinions.
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completely alienated and ignored. On the other hand, dissenting opinions
-especially intemperate or politically polarizing ones-might stoke their fury
against the majority. The few existing empirical studies have reached
conflicting conclusions. 8 4 It is a risk I am willing to take.
Kevin Stack has focused on both moral and sociological legitimacy,
arguing that separate opinions provide an otherwise unavailable window into
the decision-making process itself given the Supreme Court's practice of
secret deliberation in conference.'t They provide necessary transparency:
The existence of separate opinions is the only evidence we have that the
Justices are deliberating and engaging with each other on the merits. That
deliberation and engagement, Stack suggests, is a fundamental feature of
moral (or political) legitimacy in a democracy, as well as a means of ensuring
public buy-in or sociological legitimacy. In other words, the Supreme Court
should not be a black box.
My response is twofold. First, as a practical matter, Supreme Court
opinions (both majority and separate opinions) have been exhibiting less and
less actual engagement as the Justices become both more polarized and more
brand-conscious. The "deliberation" reflected by multiple opinions often
seems more like ships passing in the night-and firing their cannons (or
canons) at each other-than like true conversation. More important,
however, is that this is essentially a demand for procedural transparency on
top of the substantive transparency that a written opinion for the Court
already provides. But asking the Court to be procedurally transparent is asking
it to behave like the political branches, which only exacerbates the problem
of the perception of the Justices as politicians in black robes rather than as at
least somewhat disinterested legal craftsmen, and may help make that
politicization ofjudicial decision-making a reality.
Indeed, if procedural transparency is a requirement for legitimacy, why
stop at separate opinions-why not put cameras not only in the courtroom
but in the Supreme Court's conference room so that we can watch their
deliberations the same way we watch congressional hearings? Taking
transparency that far is absurd, but the thought experiment shows that
transparency is an equivocal value, especially for the judiciary. Judicial
decision-making is a qualitatively different activity than legislating, and it is
not clear that being able to see evidence of the Court's deliberations-in the
sense of an argumentative exchange among the Justices-is important in
same the way it is for other public actors. In light of the damage done by
multiple opinions in the current culture of celebrity, and the different and
potentially lesser value of transparency in the context of judicial decisionmaking, the substantive transparency of a reasoned opinion that we know
represents the view of a majority ofJustices might be the best compromise.

184.
See supra notes 83-84, 87 and accompanying text. Although it is well established that
people want their voices to be heard by those with authority to make decisions, see generally Tom
R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw (2006), it is unclear whether the presence or absence of
dissenting opinions makes a difference to their perception of being listened to.
185.
Kevin M. Stack, ThePrartire ofDissenl in the Suprne Courl, 105 YALE LJ. 2235, 2 235-36 (1996).
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Cass Sunstein offers a second defense of dissent, both on the Supreme
Court and in general. Dissent, he argues, is valuable as a force against the
human tendency toward conformity.,86 And "widespread conformity deprives
the public of information that it needs to have." 8 7 There is no doubt that he
is correct as a general matter: One well-rehearsed justification for (and
consequence of) the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment is to
encourage dissent so as to allow the marketplace of ideas to flourish in the
hope that the best ideas will prevail. But it is not so obvious that public dissents
by Supreme CourtJustices are necessary, or even helpful, to these goals. While
it is perhaps true that nothing puts an issue on the national agenda like a
Supreme Court Justice's opinion, the marketplace of political and
constitutional ideas does not seem to be in need of such a boost to flourish.
In addition to the expression of dissenting ideas in law reviews, the media,
and elsewhere, other aspects of our legal structure encourage pushback
against conformity. From the existence of 50 different state legislatures to the
adversary system, our legal structures give dissenters an incentive and an
opportunity to swim against the tide. Consider, for example, the Southern
resistance to Brown and the continued widespread ignoring of the
constitutional prohibition on school prayer,,88 or the plethora of lawsuits filed
against President Trump's various executive actions. Dissent is alive and well.
A third major reason offered in support of separate opinions is that they
influence the course of development of the law, sometimes eventually
becoming law themselves.189 Famous examples include Justice Harlan's
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,'!9 the separate opinions of Justices Holmes and
Brandeis in early twentieth century free speech cases,,), Justice Holmes'
dissent in Lochner,192 Justice Stone's dissent in Gobitis,19 and Justice Jackson's

i86.

CASs R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT i -

187.
188.

Id. at 6.
The resistance to

Brown should

I 3, 23-38

(2003).

need no citation. For school prayer, see, for example,

BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME

COURT AND SHAPED TIlE MEANING OF TIlE CONSTITUTION 262-67 (2009).
189. See CORIY LT Al., supra note I 23, at io-i i; Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of
DissenlingOpinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2010); Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 40, at 1701;
Sunstein, supra note 81, at 802-03.
i go. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-96 (1954) (distinguishing and implicitly disapproving, but not
formally overruling, Plessy).
191.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-75 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v.

Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
192.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), abrogaledby
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 3oo U.S. 379 ( 937), overmlingrecognizedby Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 861 (1992).

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601-07 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting),
193.
overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (i943)-
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dissent in Korematsu94 and his concurrence in the Steel Seizure Cases.'95 But it

turns out that these cases are the exception rather than the rule: Supreme
Court dissents are rarely cited by either courts of appeals or Supreme Court
majorities,9 6 and they rarely turn into majority opinions.97 Moreover (leaving
aside the Steel Seizure Cases) the majority opinions in these cases reflected
principles that were, sooner or later, rejected by the American public, and
thus would likely have been overruled or discredited even in the absence of
dissenting opinions. Plessy has never been formally overruled and was not even
discredited by the Court until almost 6o years after it was issued. Likewise, it
took almost three quarters of a century for the Court to overrule Korematsu.
When the overruling (or discrediting) takes decades, a "historical dissent may
provide nothing more than some quotable support for a decision that would
have been the same in any event."19 Dissents (and concurrences) do not
appear to steer the law very much or very often. As one scholar noted more
than 30 years ago, a dissent "may be a correct prophesy yet not a source of the
change. "99
A more sophisticated variant on the argument that dissents influence the
development of judge-made law is made in a recent article jointly authored
by law professor Barry Friedman, political scientist Andrew Martin, and two
former students of Friedman's.2O They suggest that dissents and concurrences
-in particular what they label "pivotal" concurrences-send important
signals about the state of the law. "Pivotal" concurrences are those written by
Justices who join the majority opinion, and whose votes are necessary to make
that opinion a majority rather than a plurality opinion, but which in some way
"undercut" the majority's reasoning.",1 Like dissents, pivotal concurrences
"spell the path toward legal change, letting litigants know precisely what issues
to push."202 Indeed, both dissents and pivotal concurrences "invite" change;

194.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242-48 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting),
overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
195.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
196.
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When)judges Dissent: A
Theoreliral and EmpiricalAnalysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 126-27 (201 1).
Bennett et al., supra note 85, at 837.
Maurice Kehnan, The Forked Pah ofDissent, 1985 SUP. CT. REv. 227, 255.
199.
Id. A more limited form of the argument that dissents affect the course of the law is that
in statutory cases, dissents signal Congress to make changes in the law. See Eskridge, supra note
88, at 388-89. My focus here is on constitutional cases.
200. Bennett et al., supra note 85.
201. Id. at 847-48.
197.

198.

202.
Id. at 870. Allison Orr Larsen suggests-and ultimately rejects-a similar argument that
"perpetual dissents" signal the possibility of change. Larsen, supra note 91, at 467-68; see also
CIARLES EVANS HUGllES, TIlE SUPREME COURT OF TILE UNITED STATES 68 (1928)

(describing

dissent as "an appeal to the intelligence of a future day"); CI ARLES P. CUR iS, JR., LIONS UNDER
THE THRONE 75 (1947) ("The minority have a curious concurrent jurisdiction over the future
[because] a dissent is a formal appeal for a rehearing . . sometime in the future .... "); M. Todd
Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REv. 283,
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the difference is that dissents invite it at some future time and pivotal
concurrences invite it more immediately.21- And, these scholars continue,
dissents and pivotal concurrences also "smooth the process of change" by
"keep [ing] changes in the law from appearing as an incomprehensible bolt
from the blue."204
My fundamental disagreement with Friedman and his colleagues is about
whether inviting (and smoothing) change in this way is good for the Court or
the country, at least in the current polarized climate. What they characterize
as sending signals, I would characterize as playing to the base. Litigants may
be reading those signals, but if so, they are reading the tea leaves of the
individual Justices rather than following the path of the law. The example of
the recent increase in state anti-abortion legislation is a case in point: The
legislators enacting these laws despite their clear unconstitutionality are
reading the dissents in earlier cases, looking at recent appointments, and
counting to five.21t As for smoothing the process of change, it seems to me
that Justices should be encouraged to make changes incrementally rather
than all at once, and not as a result of changes in personnel. Thus, any change
that appears to be "a bolt from the blue" in the absence of prior concurrences
or dissents should not be made in the first place, making such concurrences
and dissents unnecessary. What Friedman and his colleagues are essentially
suggesting is that pivotal concurrences reduce the likelihood that frequent
overruling (especially of recent cases) will diminish public confidence in the
Court as a legal-rather than political-institution.216 Maybe so, but reducing
the political cost of overruling increases its likelihood, which in turn
negatively affects doctrinal stability.
Moreover, any argument that dissents influence the subsequent course
of the law is complicated by a recent study detailing what makes dissents more
or less influential. It turns out that the more emotional or distinctive language
(read: polemic) in a dissent, the more likely it is to be cited in later majority
opinions.27 Thus, the same dynamic that allows dissents to influence the
course of the law also produces exactly the types of dissents that are most likely
to be seized on by the press and the public as evidence of a political, and
polarized, Court.
At bottom, all of the reasons discussed so far concern the costs and
benefits of suppression of disagreement in a world in which the law is not a

340 ("[D]issent allows lower courts, lawyers, and politicians to measure the weight of the opinion
and to plan a political or legal counterattack.").
203.
Bennett et al., supra note 85, at 868-70.
204.
Id. at 869-70.
205.
See Renae Reints, These Are the S/ales Thal Passed HearlbeatBills,'FORTUNE (May 31, 2019,
[https://perma.cc/
4 :oo AM), https://fortune.com/20 19/0 5 /31 /states-that-passed-heartbeat-bill
C6FR-Q82M].

206. On the relationship between overrulings and public perception, see, for example,
Deborah Hellman, The /mpoutance of Appearing Principled,3 7 AR1z. L. REv. 1 1 07, 1110-1 I (i995).
207. Rachael K Hinkle & Michael J. Nelson, How /o Lose Cases and Influence People, 8 STAT.,
PoL. & Pot'Y 195, 195 (2017).
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"brooding omnipresence in the sky."2o8 The publication of dissenting or
concurring opinions is a tangible reminder that the law is uncertain and the
Supreme Court does make law. As Robert Post has recognized, the twentieth
century explosion of separate opinions was in part a reflection of "a shift in
the Court's jurisprudential understanding of the nature of law, from a grid of
fixed and certain principles designed for the settlement of disputes, to the site
of ongoing processes of adjustment and statesmanship designed to achieve
social purposes."209 Legal realism, in short, makes "consensus more difficult"
and places a higher premium on "justifying the judges' decisions, individual
and collective.",
I can see the point. I have advocated transparency and criticized Justice
Scalia's statement that he "never thought Oliver Wendell Holmes and the
legal realists did us a favor by pointing out that all these [formalist] legal
fictions were fictions: Those judges wise enough to be trusted with the secret
already knew it."2" I can hardly claim, therefore, that forcing a pretense of
unanimity where none exists is unproblematic.
But we have come a long way since Holmes and the Realists, and even
since Post wrote in 2001. The pendulum of academic and public opinion has
swung so far toward the realist view that there is scarcely any room for an
argument that law, even as made by the Supreme Court, is about more than
raw political or ideological preferences. Dissents and concurrences, especially
on a Court as polarized as the current Court, feed the view that precedent,
principle, and legal reasoning exert no influence; it is all about Republicans
and Democrats.212 And that perception is exacerbated by the cult of the
celebrity. Suppressing dissents and concurrences is a necessary corrective.
Perhaps when the pendulum swings back, we will need full transparency
again. My proposal could be a temporary measure-until the Court starts
acting like a judicial institution rather than like nine independent law firms
competing for clients and reputation. In the meantime, forcing critiques that
illustrate the uncertainty and flexibility of law into the law reviews and
elsewhere (and I have no doubt that they will make their way into the media,
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the internet, and wherever else the public gets its information about the
Supreme Court) is the lesser of two evils.213
Two final objections can be made to my proposal. Some commentators
suggest that concurrences and dissents can improve the majority opinion by
forcing the Justice authoring the majority to respond and therefore to
produce the best possible opinion.2 A dissent "rides herd on the majority"
and keeps it accountable.m That conclusion is speculative at best, and
reading Supreme Court opinions gives the impression that majorities (or
pluralities) these days care little for what separate opinions say (even as they
purport to respond). Moreover, if my proposal eventually serves to increase
internal deliberation, that deliberation will substitute for-and be an
improvement on-written cavils in dissenting opinions. Moreover, as noted
before, criticism of Supreme Court opinions will not disappear, but will simply
be relocated.
Finally, some might take issue with my original characterization of an
atomized Supreme Court as dysfunctional. Writing in 1994, Mark Tushnet
suggested that the inclusion of memorable phrases in opinions was a way for
the Justices to establish trust. He labeled such phrases "outcroppings of
individualism" and "eruptions of individual idiosyncracy in the otherwise
bureaucratic operations of the Supreme Court." 6 These idiosyncratic
phrases, he argued, show elite opinion leaders (who ultimately influence the
public) that "a real person occupies a seat on the Court" and thus that the
Court should be trusted.217 Although Tushnet ultimately questioned whether
we should trust the elite opinion leaders themselves,218 the idea of the Court
as a group of individuals rather than as a unified institution did not seem to
trouble him. In 1994, however, the Court and its Justices still toiled in relative
obscurity. Before the internet, before ideologically stratified media, before
the American Constitution Society (and in the infancy of the Federalist

Society), the Justices were not and could not be celebrities with separate fan
bases. Ultimately, though, if Tushnet-or anyone else-would prefer an
atomized Court in today's political climate, then this Article will not persuade
him otherwise.

.
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Signed Opinions Serve Important Purposes

Commentators have made three related arguments in favor of signed
opinions. Signed opinions hold judges and Justices accountable by "put[ting]
the judge's conscience and reputation on the line."2m They preserve judicial
legitimacy in a system in which judges articulate substantive values: "Because
judges are not merely bureaucrats but value articulators, their personal
preferences-their identities-matter."220 And signed opinions both ensure
and certify that the judge has engaged in an appropriate dialogue in the
decision-making process.221 These three arguments together suggest that
unsigned opinions amount to, as Owen Fiss puts it (following Hannah
Arendt), "Rule by Nobody."222 Without signed opinions, we end up with the
Court as a faceless bureaucracy.
But it cannot be a matter of general principle that all judicial opinions
must be signed. The Court issues unsigned orders all the time, often
uncontroversially. It uses per curiam opinions in both important and trivial
cases, remands cases for reconsideration without attribution and with little
explanation, and denies (or grants) certiorari without either attribution or
explanation.
The question thus comes down to whether the benefits of signed
opinions in most Supreme Court cases outweigh the costs. The trade-off here
is essentially whether we care more about the accountability, reputation, and
legitimacy of the Court as a whole or of each individual Justice. Signed
opinions enhance the reputation of the individual Justices, but, as I have
suggested, at the cost of the reputation and legitimacy of the Court as an
institution. Signed opinions also encourage Justices to dig in their heels and
not give an inch: Judges cannot afford to be modest when their reputations
are at stake. They cannot afford to acknowledge that their opponent has a
point when doing so will expose them to personal attack.... The signed
opinion,... becomes a means of eschewing humility."22.
Some might argue that the accountability of the Court depends on our
ability to hold each Justice accountable. Collective accountability, in other
words, is built on individual accountability. Public scrutiny of signed opinions
puts pressure on the individual signatories to be consistent and principled.
Remove that scrutiny, the argument goes, and you create a collective action
problem: EachJustice will be confident that some otherJustice will be blamed
for a per curiam opinion that flouts consistency or principle and thus willjoin
it whenever it is expedient or politically comfortable to do so. Requiring
Justices to sign their names is a way to make them assert "Iam doing this
2 i 9.
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because I believe the law requires it." Cary Coglianese makes a similar
argument that individual agency heads should be required to sign off on
actions taken by their agencies, to avoid presidential "overreach": presidential
control over matters committed to agency discretion.224
But an unprincipled per curiam (and especially a series of them) exposes
the Court to public opprobrium, tainting all the Justices and reducing the
likelihood that lower courts and other government officials will obey the
Court's mandates. Critical as I am about the influence of celebrity on judicial
behavior, I am not so cynical as to believe that personal reputation is the only
thing that keeps Justices principled. In addition, the cult of celebrity has so
diluted the force of individual accountability that a signature is edging further
from affirming "I am doing this because I believe the law requires it" and
closer to affirming "I am doing this so you can see how loyal I am to my fans."
Moreover, under current conditions, the accountability of signed
opinions has the potential to backfire. Studies have shown that when
individuals are accountable to a known (as opposed to an unknown)
audience, they "adopt positions likely to gain the favor of those to whom they
are accountable."225 To the extent that many Justices are aiming their
opinions at particular, known, audiences rather than writing for the public at
large, they will tailor them to those audiences-as we saw in the examples of
opinions concurring in certiorari denials. Only when writing for an audience
whose views are unknown (or varied) do decision-makers "thinkin more selfcritical, integratively complex ways in which they consider multiple
perspectives."226 And at least one study suggests that the known-audience
effect reaches back to the decision-making process itself: Knowing the views
of the audience results in "a change in perspective or evaluat[ion] . . . and not
merely ...
a reporting shift designed to please the audience."227 Trying to
hold celebrity-seeking Justices individually accountable through signed
opinions might influence their actual decisions as well as their justifications,
biasing them towards the views of their polarized fan bases.
3.

It Won't Work

The final objection to my proposal is more practical: It will not
accomplish its goals. I can imagine two different objections, polar opposites.
The first is that it won't work at all, either because vote counts will leak and
Justices willjust publish their dissenting and concurring opinions elsewhere,
or because the sniping, signaling, and pandering that currently takes place in
separate opinions will be displaced into oral argument instead. The second is
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that, in a sense, it will work too well, reducing transparency and suppressing
any dissent that exists. That would allow an unaccountable majority to impose
its will unfettered by minority criticism, and perhaps lead the public to
discount the Court's opinions by assuming that every case is five to four.
My blanket response is that even if these potential problems have
traction, they do not doom my proposal. If Congress bans separate opinions
and negative consequences follow, there is a simple solution. Because this is a
statutory fix rather than a constitutional one, Congress can repeal the law.
Beyond that, I can offer only tentative responses to these practical
objections. ThatJustices might publish their separate opinions elsewhere is a
feature, not a bug. A dissent that lacks the imprimatur of the United States
Reports and that is somewhat remote in time and place from the single
majority opinion will carry less weight than an official dissent or concurrence,
but it will carry some weight. Moreover, its influence (and that of the majority
opinion as well) will be more directly related to its persuasiveness and less so
to its author. As it stands, a polarized public need only look at the syllabus to
decide whether to support or reject a decision: Half the country, upon
learning thatJustices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor dissent, will be
immediately suspicious and disinclined to take the majority opinion seriously;
the other half will react the same way upon learning that Justices Thomas,
Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh dissent. If the elites who read opinions and
translate them for the public (including legal academics and journalists)
actually have to read the opinions to find out what they say-and then search
out dissenting voices-that is already an improvement.
As for the same phenomena simply reappearing in oral argument, there
are several reasons why that is unlikely." 8 First, oral arguments are face-to-face
interactions. People are much more likely to curb their worst impulses in faceto-face interactions than when they are writing in solitude-people say things
on the internet and even in email that they would never say in person.22 9
Second, oral arguments garner much less attention than the release of
Supreme Court opinions. Like publication of dissents in other forums, then,
any bad behavior at oral argument will have fewer spillover effects on the
press, the public, or the Justices.
Leaks are more problematic. My proposal may well give rise to a
temptation for Justices to play to their fans and burnish their political
credentials by announcing to the world both their own vote and, where the
vote was close, the actual vote count.2 3 Or some Justices might inform legal

228. One study recently found that Justices already use oral argument to advocate their
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databases of the author and the vote count, or even provide the databases with
separate "opinions" that could be included in the database. The best we could
hope for is that the Justices' concern for the Court as an institution-whether
now, or after enhancement by the operation of the proposal itself-might
lead them to restrain themselves. Playing to the base might also be less visible
(and therefore less damaging) if not conducted on the Supreme Court's
website, the pages of the United States Reports, or other official or semiofficial sources.
Finally, there is the possibility that by fostering a norm of consensus, my
proposal would lead not to accommodation and compromise but rather to
overbearing and unaccountable majorities exploiting the lack of separate
opinions to impose controversial broad and deep rulings.3, That is indeed a
risk, but again, concern for the Court as an institution might temper the
majority. Broad, deep rulings on highly-contested issues-especially if there is
a persistent minority and winners and losers turn out to track political
divides-could generate a backlash against the Court and make those rulings
harder to enforce.232 Justice Ginsburg, for example, has suggested that the
breadth of Roe v. Wade is one major source of the political reaction against
it. 2t Others disagree,34 but the suggestion raises the possibility of it
happening with other cases. One hopes the Court would be cautious enough
to try to avoid such a backlash. Once again, moreover, one purpose of my
proposal is to change the Justices' focus from their own reputations to that of
the Court as an institution; to the extent that it succeeds, there is less concern
that unfettered majorities in the future would endanger the Court by riding
roughshod over silent dissenters.
Even if my proposal does lead to compromise rather than a mere
muzzling of dissenters, there is a possibility that the public would see it
differently. The argument is that under the current regime, a case with a
single opinion sends a strong signal of the correctness of the decision; 25
Americans who disagree with it cannot rely on ad hominem or political
explanations for the Court's decision. Under my proposal, by contrast, there
would be no way for the Court to send such a signal, and people might assume
that every case was in fact a five to four political decision. While this is a
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possible cost of my proposal, it is not a significant one. In controversial cases
that capture the attention of the public, I do not think the Court has issued a
unanimous opinion in more than 6o years-not since Brown. (And the
unanimity in Brown nevertheless failed to convince those opposed to the
decision to obey it.)23 We are not losing much if we lose a signal that gets
used only once or twice a century.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court is dysfunctional in many ways. But one of its
dysfunctions exacerbates the others. When Justices put their own reputation
and legacy above the reputation and credibility of the Court as an institution,
there are ripple effects from the confirmation process to the decision-making
process to public perception of the Court. If we can temper Justices' ability or
incentive to play to their polarized fan base, we might be able to reduce some
of the dysfunction. This Article suggests that the best way to do so would be
for Congress to prohibit separate opinions and require that the single opinion
for the Court be an anonymous per curiam that does not reveal how many
Justices join it. Enacting such legislation could enhance the reputation of the
Court as a legal rather than political institution, reduce polarization (and
incivility) on the Court, eliminate plurality opinions that create uncertainty
and unpredictability, and turn the Justices back into mere mortal judges who
keep our constitutional democracy humming along despite whatever goes on
in the more political branches.
In the end, of course, my proposal guarantees nothing and poses real
risks. We can hope that it would work as advertised and provide an overall
benefit despite some costs, but we cannot be sure. Would it promote internal
judicial deliberation or merely silence dissent and allow five Justices to impose
their unfettered will? Would it produce more certainty and stability, or less?
Would it improve or degrade public opinion of the Court? Would it
depoliticize or further politicize the Court and the appointments process?
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Would institutional accountability diminish in the absence of individual
accountability? In particular, even if the proposal would work in the abstract
to keep a functional Court from becoming dysfunctional, would it work in our
current position, with the institutions, norms, and Justices we already have?
We cannot know the answers, although I have tried to make arguments that
the results would be favorable.
More broadly, enacting such a law might at least serve as a wake-up call,
signaling to the Justices that they need to realign their priorities. At the very
least, perhaps this Article, in exposing the transformation of some Supreme
CourtJustices into publicity-seeking media personalities like the Kardashians,
might seep into public and judicial consciousness and serve some shaming
function.
But the ultimate question is whether the situation is so dire-whether the
cult of celebrity and its related dysfunctions are so harmful to the Supreme
Court and its role in our constitutional democracy-that it is worth taking a
risk. I think it is.

